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Analyses of intended action, in a crim inal law context as elsewhere, tend to agree 
th a t it comprises a relevant desire and  belief. W hile m uch attention has been 
paid to the elem ent of desire, little has been paid to belief. This thesis suggests 
th a t closer attention to belief is necessary in understanding the m oral differences 
between intention crimes and  other crimes. It argues th a t a  m ental state akin to 
belief is a necessary com ponent in all intention crimes, considers w hether 
“ belief'’ is the correct term  and w hat it means in this context, and  considers the 
m oral context in which intention crimes are categorised. Having considered 
those m atters, it seeks to identify the role th a t belief plays and  the type o f belief 
required . I t  then seeks to identify the m oral role th a t belief plays, considers 
w hat o ther factors are of m oral im portance, and com pares the m oral im portance 
of belief w ith those o ther factors. I t  is subm itted th a t this analysis reveals the 
central m oral im portance of belief, and provides a clearer and  m ore m orally 
satisfactory distinction between intention and o ther m ens rea than  has been 
identified h itherto .
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The concept o f intention and its application in the criminal law have generated a great 
deal o f work. Is there anything left to say on these issues? This thesis will argue that 
there remain matters that have not received enough attention, and that by attending to 
them, it is possible to clarify what the common ingredients o f the mens rea o f  intention 
crimes really are or ought to be.
Those who have examined the concept o f intention often include belief as one o f its 
essential features. A person is not, generally, held to have acted intentionally unless she 
had a relevant belief about the results of that action. Despite this, the concept o f belief in 
the context o f the criminal law has not received much attention1. It is taken as a given. 
Attention is often focussed on other matters, and by so doing, whether explicitly or 
implicitly, judgement is made on the importance of belief without, it is submitted, proper 
attention being directed to belief itself, th is  thesis will argue that an understanding of 
belief is essential if  intention, and in particular the moral dimension of intention crimes, 
is to be understood. .
The problem of the meaning of intention
One of the main difficulties with the concept o f intention -  and one o f the main 
reasons there has been so much discussion about it -  is that the word itself and its
1 Stephen Shute, “Knowledge and Belief in the Criminal Law” in Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines o f  the 
General Part edited by Stephen Shute and A.P. Simester, Oxford, 2002.
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derivatives can validly be interpreted in different ways. If pressed with examples, many 
o f us can feel unsure whether certain actions can properly be considered as intended -  
especially when the person acting does not particularly want the result to occur. If  a 
contract killer shoots someone, unhappy about earning his living that way, does he intend 
to kill? If I shoot at someone through a closed window, do I intend to break the glass? If 
I pull my child’s bad tooth out, do I intend to cause her pain? Perhaps most people would 
feel instinctively that the first o f these was intended and the last o f them was not 
intended, but would be unsure or would differ on the second o f them. Can a definitive 
line be drawn between those we consider intended and those we do not?
If the meanings o f “intend” and its derivatives can validly remain open to 
interpretation, after decades of intensive scholarly argument, perhaps no such line can be 
drawn, in terms o f ordinary usage. But the criminal law needs to draw a clear boundary 
somewhere and somehow. It should do this without doing violence to the language, so as 
to be intelligible. But if  “intention” cannot be precisely defined in ordinary usage, some 
degree of artificiality is inevitable while that word is used. And what the law ought to do 
is ensure that the concept o f intention serves rather than dictates the operation o f justice -  
punishing those whose moral culpability is such that they ought to be punished, and 
punished proportionally, for those crimes that properly have the mens rea o f intention.
How does belief fit into this inquiry?
It has been noted that most commentators accept that belief is a requirement o f 
intention. That contention will be addressed in the course o f this thesis, but if  it may be 
correct, and belief is always, or ordinarily, a component o f  intention, it ought to be 
understood if  intention is to be understood. Since there is still significant disagreement 
about what intention means in the criminal law, it makes sense to examine its constituent 
parts to discover if  they are understood in the context. If  it is accepted that belief is one 
o f those constituent parts, it follows that its nature should be understood and its 
importance in this context assessed. It is notable that the disagreement about intention 
tends to focus on “oblique intention”, which -  as Chapter 1 identifies -  is essentially 
action treated as intention in which there is a belief about the resulting harm, but no
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desire for the harm or for what flows directly from it. Attention has tended to focus on 
the importance of desire in this context, often with no, or barely any, consideration of the 
importance o f belief.
A number of important questions remain unanswered while these issues remain 
unresolved. If intention crimes were to be limited to “direct intention”, where would that 
leave “oblique intention” crimes? How could any distinction in level of punishment be 
justified morally? What practical implications might there be if  there was a greater 
emphasis generally on desire (or other factors) and less or no attention paid to belief?
If beliefs are essential or at least important components of criminal intention, it 
follows that belief ought to be understood if  criminal intention is to be understood. It will 
be argued that, as a consequence, the concept of criminal intention can only make moral 
sense if the concept o f belief is understood in that context.
Structure o f the thesis
The first four chapters will seek to analyse the concepts and the context involved in 
this inquiry: the relevant type o f intended action, the role o f belief in that type o f action, 
what “belief’ means in this context, the moral context in which intention crimes should 
be considered, and the role belief plays in that moral context. The remaining chapters 
will then consider the moral significance of belief in that context and its importance when 
compared with other factors.
C hapter 1 will seek to establish what is meant by intended action for the purposes of 
the criminal law, and to establish whether belief is always a necessary component o f such 
action. The chapter will then attempt to resolve the confusion o f terminology, identified 
earlier in the introduction, in the way that actions resulting in intention crimes are 
described.
C hapter 2 will seek to identify what the mental state referred to as “belief’ is: 
whether what is being referred to really is “belief’, and what relevant characteristics that 
mental state has.
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C hapter 3 will seek to establish the particular moral context in which the importance 
o f belief is to be assessed, by identifying how the concept o f moral responsibility is 
treated within the criminal law, specifically with regard to intention.
C hapter 4 will build on the analysis in the preceding chapters to seek to establish with 
more precision what role belief plays in intention crimes and what type o f belief is 
required for such crimes.
C hapter 5 will consider what moral role belief has to play in intention crimes.
C hapter 6 will consider the moral significance o f other factors involved in intention 
crimes.
C hapter 7 will consider the moral significance o f belief compared to these other 
factors, given the moral context within which the criminal law operates.
The Conclusion will summarise the findings of the preceding chapters, and add some 
final remarks, in particular concerning the definition o f intention crimes.
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CHAPTER 1
DEFINING INTENDED ACTION AND ESTABLISHING THE ROLE OF BELIEF
Commentators who have considered the concept o f intention, whether in the context of 
the criminal law or otherwise, have tended to assume that intended action requires a 
relevant belief (and often, if  not always, a relevant desire). But it is not immediately 
obvious that belief is a necessary component of such action. Since the moral significance 
o f belief as such a component is clearly to some extent dependent on whether it is a 
necessary component at all, and whether it is necessary in every case, an attempt will be 
made to establish what is meant by intended action for the purposes o f  the criminal law 
and establish whether belief is always a necessary component o f such action.
Having established what intended actions are relevant, and before addressing the role 
belief plays in intention crimes in greater detail in the remainder o f the thesis, this chapter 
will then attempt to resolve the confusion o f terminology, identified in the introduction, 
in the way that actions resulting in intention crimes are described.
“Belief’ is usually the word used in this context. Whether that is the word that should 
be used, and precisely what it means in the context o f intention, will be addressed in the 
next chapter. For the purposes o f this chapter, the word “belief’ will be used.
For the purposes o f criminal law, a distinction has come to be made between “direct 
intention” and “oblique intention”. These will be addressed in turn.
“Direct intention”
An intended action o f this kind (also referred to as “paradigm intention”) is usually 
described in such terms as one that the agent wanted or desired to occur, or one that it 
was her purpose to achieve -  whether the action is itself the purpose or is a means to 
another purpose.
5
Despite the disagreements about what intention is, there is a degree o f agreement 
among many commentators about what its components should include. Some sort of 
consensus finds its way into the textbooks. Most commentators agree that the intended 
acts connected to the agent’s purposes include not only the ends o f such purposes but also 
the means o f achieving such ends. However intention is described, concepts o f belief and 
desire are usually referred to in any in-depth analysis.
But it is not obvious from some descriptions o f intention that a relevant belief is 
always required. Some descriptions include it as a component in certain circumstances 
and not in others. A.P. Simester & G.R. Sullivan’s formulation, for example, is that 
someone intends to do an action (or bring about a consequence) if:
(a) He wants to do that action (or to bring about that consequence), or
(b) He believes it is possible for him to achieve something he wants by doing that action (or by 
bringing about that consequence); and
(c) He behaves as he does because of his desire in (a) or his belief in (b).2
Clearly belief is a component if  (c) is coupled with (b). But belief does not appear to 
be a component if  (c) is coupled with (a). Here the end is also the means: the action that 
is desired is simply the one that is done, and desire is simply coupled with action. This 
category may be regarded as that o f the purest intentions -  the paradigm of paradigms. 
Such an interpretation may suggest that what is of essential importance to intention is the 
desire behind it, and that beliefs only play a supporting role on occasions -  perhaps when 
separate means are required to achieve the ends.
There is another problem: one can apparently intend an action or consequence even if 
one does not believe that it will succeed. An example o f an act involving criminal intent 
is suggested in Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, and is often referred to:
If D has resolved to kill P and he fires a loaded gun at him with the object of doing so, he 
intends to kill. It is immaterial that he is aware that he is a poor shot, that P is nearly out of 
range, and that his chances of success are small. It is sufficient that killing is his object or 
purpose... that he acts in order to kill.3
2 Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, Oxford, 2003, page 128.
3 London, 2002, page 70-71.
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D’s chances may be small (in fact, Antony Duff has argued that one can intend to do 
something that is objectively impossible4), and his belief may also be that his chances are 
small (whether the subjective belief can be that success is impossible will be addressed 
later in the chapter). In fact this example can be used to tackle both problems raised. It 
can usefully demonstrate that D may have other beliefs relevant to intention besides that 
relating to his chances of success. For example, he would seem to believe that:
a) the gun is loaded;
b) by pressing a finger on the trigger a bullet will be released at speed;
c) by aiming the gun in the direction he has pointed it, the bullet may hit P;
d) the thing he sees in that direction is a human being;
e) that human being is P;
f) if  the bullet hits P it may kill him;
and so on.
Some o f these examples are beliefs that seem obvious, and because they are obvious, 
may not be consciously considered by D. (Whether there are such things as unconscious 
beliefs will be addressed in the next chapter. For the moment, however, it is the 
importance o f any such “beliefs” -  however they are classified — that is being 
considered.) But these beliefs are a part and parcel o f D ’s action, without which his 
purpose will fail. One crucial belief in establishing criminal intention o f murder is that D 
believes his target to be a human being. Like the other beliefs listed, D may not give this 
any prior consideration, although he presumably does give prior consideration to the 
target’s being P. Whether in fact it is P is not of importance in establishing criminal 
intent. But inherent in D ’s belief that he is aiming at P is his belief that P is a human 
being. If one were to ask D whether he was aiming at a human being, his honest answer 
would have to be in the affirmative. If he actually believed that P was a monkey, he 
would not have the mens rea o f murder.
If D could only vaguely see the target, and he could not tell at that range what the 
target was, the position becomes less clear. For example, assume that instead o f the 
Smith and Hogan example, D was on a firing range, trying to improve his marksmanship
4 Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability, Oxford, 1990, page 56.
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skills prior to his attempt to kill P. He is shooting at long-range at what he has been told 
are a line o f dummies. He does not believe P to be in the vicinity o f the firing range, but 
one o f the dummies reminds him of P, and D shoots at that target believing (without any 
doubt) it to be a dummy. He has suddenly abandoned his desire to improve his 
marksmanship and shoots merely to satisfy his fantasy o f killing P. As it so happens, the 
target was P, who dies. Can D have committed murder?
According to the Simester and Sullivan formulation above, a combination o f a) and c) 
may appear to allow it -  if  D can properly be said to be behaving “because o f his desire” 
to kill P. It is not immediately clear whether murder has been committed in such a 
scenario.
Glanville Williams appeared to suggest that a similar scenario could be murder in 
discussing the case of R v Finney5. Finney was a negligence case, in which a medical 
attendant turned on a tap with scalding water into a bath, apparently thinking that the 
patient had got out, but the patient was still there, and died. Williams used it to consider 
a different level of culpability (of negligence). But he supposed that if  the attendant had 
earlier communicated his desire to kill that patient, “it would turn the case from one of 
possible manslaughter to one o f clear murder”6. Does that mean that if  the attendant 
believed that he was pouring water into an empty bath, but had the desire to kill the 
patient, he would be guilty o f murder?
What Williams stated later in the same work suggests that he did not mean this. He 
defined intention as follows: “Intention is a state o f mind consisting o f knowledge o f any 
requisite circumstances plus desire that any requisite result shall follow from one’s 
conduct, or else foresight that the result will certainly follow.”7 A requisite circumstance 
for the attendant to know would surely include that he had some chance o f hitting the 
patient with the water. Otherwise it is a mere wish. If  the attendant believed he was 
pouring the water into an empty bath, his thoughts could be characterised as: “If only the 
patient was here, and this scalding water was pouring over him, and I could get rid of 
him.” However abominable that desire, for it to amount to intention it must, based on
5 (1874) 12 Cox 625.
6 Glanville Williams, The Mental Element in Crime, Jerusalem, 1965, page 11.
7 Ibid, page 20.
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Williams’s reasoning, be grounded in some knowledge of some chance of success. If that 
is correct, a relevant belief needs to accompany the relevant desire.
One cannot, on that basis, intend to do that which one believes one cannot do. Many 
commentators appear to support this contention. To give some examples: Aristotle8; 
Antony Duff9; B.F. Malle, L.J. Moses and D.A. Baldwin10; John R. Searle11; and Donald 
Davidson12.
However, not all commentators appear to agree. The arguments o f those who may be 
read as holding the contrary view are assessed below.
Jennifer Hornsby has stated that “people can attempt to do what they believe to be 
impossible”13. She draws this conclusion from the example o f someone who is “quite 
confident that she stands no chance whatever o f success in saving a drowning a child” but 
“is anxious not to be seen to have done nothing”, and thus has “a desire to be seen to have 
attempted to save the child” and so dives in. Hornsby is concerned with attempting rather 
than intending at this point, and she does not comment on whether the diver intended to 
do that which she believed to be impossible. But whatever her views may be on intention 
in this context, strictly speaking the desire in Hornsby’s scenario is, as she stated, to be 
seen to attempt to save the child. It would follow that her intention was to make the same 
gesture, rather than actually save the child. If the diver believed that the gesture would or 
may succeed, she was not intending to do what she believed to be impossible. 
Alternatively, if  the diver was intending to save the child (perhaps in addition to being 
seen to try), Hornsby may mean by “quite confident that she stands no chance o f success” 
something less than a complete conviction (just as Smith and Hogan’s D may be quite 
confident that his shot will not hit P, but still considers there to be some chance of 
success). In that case, there is a belief in the possibility o f success. Whatever Hornsby
g
The Nicomachean Ethics, HI ii, Penguin edition, 2004, page 55. At least (according to this translation), 
Aristotle considered that one could not choose the impossible, and assuming that Aristotle would agree that
intention involves choice, he would presumably consider intention in the same way.£
Intention, Agency, and Criminal Liability, Oxford, 1990, page 56.
10 The editors of Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations o f  Social Cognition, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 2001, in their Introduction, pages 3-4.
11 Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy o f mind, Cambridge, 1983, page 34 and pages 103-4.
12 Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford, 1980, pages 100-1.
13 “On What’s Intentionally Done” in Action and Value in Criminal Law, edited by Stephen Shute, John 
Gardner and Jeremy Horder, Oxford, 1993, page 60, footnote 10.
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precisely meant, her example does not, it is submitted, give any strong grounds for the 
case that one can intend to do that which one believes to be impossible.
Michael E. Bratman has stated that “there need be no irrationality in intending to A 
and yet still not believing that one will.” '4 Although not believing that one will is 
different to not believing that one might, he gave as one example something that appears 
to be an intention to do the impossible: “Suppose there is a log blocking my driveway; 
and suppose I intend to move the log this morning but believe that since it is too heavy I 
will not move it.” He decides to call a tree company to move it that afternoon. “So my 
plan for the day includes my moving the log this morning and my having the tree 
company move it this afternoon. But it seems folly to plan to cause the log to be moved 
twice.”14 5 Bratman suggests that the rational person drops his original intention to move 
the log himself after forming the better plan o f using the company.
Bratman’s log example raises at least three issues. Firstly, was there ever a real 
intention to move the log personally? It may have been briefly considered and then 
dropped -  in which case it hardly amounts to a plan or intention. Secondly, assuming 
that there was such an intention, it seems irrational and nonsensical for P to continue to 
“plan to cause the log to be moved” himself when he believed that he will not do so. 
Thirdly, does P have a complete conviction that he cannot move the log himself? 
Bratman stated that P ’s belief is that he “will not” move the log, and does not state that 
P’s belief was that the feat was impossible. Perhaps he meant instead that P considered 
the chances o f his moving the log extremely small: P thought about trying to move it 
himself, but dismissed that plan as unrealistic, and so called the tree company. Whatever 
situation (or situations) he envisaged, Bratman did not go on to defend a position that 
someone can have an intention to do something while believing that it is literally 
impossible.
Michael Moore has stated that “Although it is rare, one can even aim at the object o f 
one’s desire while having no belief that one can attain it and even while having a belief 
that one cannot attain it.”16 However, he did not go on to suggest that “aim” in this
14 Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Harvard, 1987, page 38.
15 Ibid, page 39.
16 Placing Blame, Oxford, 1997, page 410.
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context amounted to intention. Perhaps Moore was referring to a mere wish. In any 
event, he did not go on to defend a position that an intention can exist in such 
circumstances.
G. E. M. Anscombe has been cited as a proponent o f impossible intentions, although it 
may be that she has been misrepresented. She has stated that “in some cases one can be 
as certain as possible that one will do something, and yet intend not to do it.”17 She gives 
as examples someone intending to cling on to a ledge, and someone intending not to 
break down under torture -  both as certain as possible that they will fail. It may be that 
Anscombe (like Hornsby and Bratman) meant something less than impossibility (for 
example, believing that there is an outside chance o f being rescued). But even if  she did 
mean impossibility, the person who intends to cling on to the ledge and the person who 
intends not to break down under torture do not intend to do so forever or for the rest of 
their natural lives (unless they are deranged and believed they could do so). It is quite 
possible and rational to continue to believe that one can keep going from this moment to 
that, seeking to put off the inevitable for as long as possible. Such intentions do not have 
to be tied to an indefinite period of time. The circumstances o f these examples can 
perhaps mislead by inviting a conflation of the impossibility o f a long-term intention 
(getting out of the situation) with the short-term intention (keeping going). In more 
mundane circumstances, the separation is easier to understand. I may intend to eat a meal 
because I am very hungry and, if  pressed about it, honestly say that I believe I will die 
unless I eat something at some point. But o f course, I believe that I will die anyway, 
eventually. Eating only puts the moment off for a while, and continuing to eat may do so 
for a few decades. Anscombe’s examples are similar except that time is more pressing -  
the timeframes are minutes and hours rather than days and decades.
But in any event, in another part of the same book Anscombe appears to take a 
different approach to that attributed to her18 in the above passage. She stated that to 
understand a person’s intentions, “the future state of affairs mentioned must be such that 
we can understand the agent’s thinking it will or may be brought about by the action
17 Intention, Oxford, 1957, page 92.
18 By, for example, B.F. Malle & J. Knobe, “The Distinction between Desire and Intention: A Folk- 
Conceptual Analysis” in Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations o f  Social Cognition edited by B.F. 
Malle, LJ. Moses and D.A. Baldwin, Camb, Mass or London, 2001.
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about which he is being questioned.”19 She gave as an example o f this going upstairs in a 
house claiming to be getting a camera, and being challenged that it could not be done, 
since the camera was in the cellar: “If I say: ‘No, I quite agree, there is no way for a 
person at the top o f the house to get the camera; but still I am going upstairs to get it’ I 
begin to be unintelligible.”20 It would appear that Anscombe too was not defending the 
position that an agent can intend to do what she believes to be impossible.
Irving Thalberg, however, appears on the face of it unequivocal on this issue. He has 
stated that “a person can intend to do something which he believes to be impossible”21. 
But examination of his argument as a whole shows this contention to mean something 
other than what it initially suggests. He qualifies the contention by stating that “For the 
majority o f hazardous enterprises, there is at least one example of past success. So 
probability o f success is greater than zero.” A probability greater than zero is not, of 
course, the same as impossibility. He gives an example of a recently drowned swimmer 
found by a lifeguard. “Despite the apparent futility o f it, he gives the victim artificial 
respiration.”22 Thalberg accepts that the lifeguard may have other intentions -  for 
example, to look as though he is trying to revive the body — but considers that the 
lifeguard could still have the intention to resuscitate: “In fact these other aims could give 
him all the more reason to try, and consequently have the intention of making the 
drowned man breathe.”23 We do not believe that we can make corpses breathe; but one 
can certainly try or intend to revive someone if  one believes that the “probability of 
success is greater than zero” -  i.e. believing that there is a chance that it is not a corpse 
yet. In other words, one can intend such a thing where there is a belief that success is 
possible, however improbable. Thalberg is saying that one can intend the “impossible” 
when what is meant is not literally “impossible” but rather “highly improbable”.
The disagreement between these commentators and others perhaps has more to do 
with terminology -  the meaning of such words as “impossible” in the contexts referred to. 
While a minority o f commentators may be read as suggesting that there can be an
19 Ibid, page 35.
20 Ibid, page 36.
21 Enigmas o f  Agency: Studies in the Philosophy o f  Human Action, Humanities Press, 1972, page 107.
22 Ibid, page 110.
23 Ibid,page 111.
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intention to do what the agent believes impossible, none has argued this in a literal sense, 
at least not persuasively.
This makes sense in a criminal law context. Going back to the firing range, D’s 
intention -  or his purpose -  was to shoot at a dummy, albeit because o f a desire o f killing 
P. D would have regarded himself as having failed if he missed the dummy, but not if  he 
missed P.24 P’s death was just a bonus. It was not, surely, his intention. To take another 
example, if  someone irritated me, and I resisted the urge to punch her, and later vented 
my anger at a punchbag, wishing that it was her face, I would surely not have intended to 
punch her: what I intended to do was punch the bag.
Back at the firing range, murder may become more likely the closer P is to D. What if  
D is close enough to think there is a reasonable chance that it is P -  he does not believe 
strongly that it is either P or a dummy, but fires anyway? Whether one considers that 
murder or manslaughter may depend on one’s moral standpoint. What if  P was much 
nearer to D and D recognised him immediately and fired at him with the desire to kill 
him? Few would presumably have difficulty in considering the mens rea for murder 
satisfied in that scenario.
In these examples, D ’s desire may be the same, but his belief about what he is aiming 
to do -  whether to hit a dummy or kill a human being (who happens to be P) -  differs. If 
it is objected that the desire is also different, because in some instances it amounts to a 
fantasy rather than anything connected to reality, then that is because the desire differs as 
a result o f the relevant belief. Belief in this instance is thus crucial in evaluating the mens 
rea o f the offence -  whether it amounts to intention or recklessness or something else.
The same is true in considering any intention offence. For example, even a 
kleptomaniac cannot intend to steal something she firmly believes she owns, however 
strong her desire may be to obtain the possessions o f others -  if  she did “attempt” to 
“steal” her own possessions she would be indulging in fantasy. A crime of direct 
intention always requires the agent to believe that the relevant harm was at least the 
possible result of her action.
24 This way of testing intentions has been identified by Antony Duff as the “failure test”: see his Intention, 
Agency and Criminal Liability, Oxford, 1990, especially at page 61.
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“Oblique intention”
An intended action o f this kind is described along the lines of the following: one that 
the agent did not want or desire or have as her purpose, but one that she was virtually 
certain would occur as a consequence o f  her action. It is immediately easier to see the 
importance o f belief in this type o f intention: the agent must have believed (or had some 
similar mental state o f awareness) that the harm would (virtually certainly) have 
happened.
Belief is clearly necessary for oblique intention, but it may not be sufficient. Under 
the law as currently settled after the judgment in R  v Woollin, a jury is “entitled to find” 
the intention for murder when a defendant foresees the serious harm or death as a 
virtually certain consequences.25 It follows, therefore, that a jury is also entitled not to 
find intention in such circumstances. In Woollin, the House o f Lords did not specify in 
what circumstances such intention might not be found, but it is has been suggested that 
the wording of the test suggests that such intention requires more than simply the level o f 
foresight -  possibly requires, for example, an immoral purpose or motive26. However, 
foresight -  the belief element -  is clearly a necessary feature o f this type o f intention. 
Without it, oblique intention would simply not exist. The gradations o f belief -  from 
possible to probable to certain -  are o f key importance in a jury’s ascertaining whether 
they can find intention, and also to the debate about whether this type o f criminal 
intention should be enlarged or abolished or further refined.
25 [1999] 1 AC 82. The judgment did not state that this interpretation of intention applied to all intention 
crimes. But commentators have assumed that the same reasoning would apply.
For example, see Alan Nome in “After Woollin” [1999] Crim.L.R.532. Nom e’s argument on this point 
is considered in Chapter 7.
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The meaning o f “intention” and similar words in this context
The first part of this chapter has endeavoured to demonstrate that intention crimes 
always require a belief component. Having identified the different types o f actions that 
result in intention crimes, and before going on to consider the moral significance o f belief 
as a component o f them, it is worth considering how those actions should be described.
Words such as “intention”, “intended”, “intentionally”, “deliberately”, and 
“knowingly” are used to describe actions of the sort being discussed, without it 
necessarily being clear what precisely is meant by those words: whether the description is 
o f directly intended actions, obliquely intended actions, or both, or something else. 
Without adopting a particular interpretation o f what such words mean in the particular 
context o f intention crimes, they are apt to mean different things in different contexts. Is 
it possible to identify a description that covered all relevant actions -  both directly and 
obliquely intended?
One o f the reasons that there have been such difficulties in understanding -  and 
disputes in interpreting -  the concept o f intention in the criminal law is that the word 
“intention” and its derivatives pose particular problems. Is the ordinary meaning of 
intention always to be understood as being directed to purposes, or can its meaning be 
widened? One attempt to clarify these linguistic problems was by R. A. Duff. He sought 
to differentiate between “intended” acts and acts committed “intentionally”. According 
to Duff, the former include only directly intended results; whereas the latter also include
17obliquely intended consequences.
However, this distinction has not been universally accepted.28 And Duff himself 
accepted that there is a normative aspect to intentionally29, from which it follows that 
pinning the meanings down is to some extent artificial. He also made no attempt to 
defend his distinction linguistically. There remain problems with the distinction in 
certain contexts. Elsewhere, Duff stated that the man who drinks a bottle o f whisky does
27
28
R. A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability, Oxford, 1990, page 95.
See for example Jennifer Hornsby, “Action and Value” in Action and Value in the Criminal Law edited
by Stephen Shute, John Gardner and Jeremy Horder, Oxford, 1993. 
2 Ibid, page 85.
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not intend to get a hangover30; but can it be said that the man brought about such an 
expected side-effect “intentionally”? Such an example seems to strain the meaning o f the 
word. The problem with using the word “intentionally” is that it retains the concept of 
“intention”, and suggests in this case that the man purposefully gave himself a hangover.
H. L. A. Hart considered that the meaning of “intentionally” in certain circumstances 
was opaque. For example, the person who breaks glass to hear the noise “would be said 
to have broken the glass intentionally (though not, perhaps, to have intentionally broken 
the glass)”; and in the case of R v Desmond, Barrett and Others31, in which the 
dynamiting o f prison walls resulted in deaths in nearby buildings, while one might not 
say o f such a person that “he intentionally killed” one could also not say that he “did what 
he did ««intentionally”.32
Hart and Duff agreed that, whatever words may be used, Mr Barrett was fully 
responsible for the expected side-effect of his action in trying to escape. For the same 
reason, it can be argued that the man who drinks a bottle o f whisky is fully responsible 
for his own hangover. And that example could be extended further, into a criminal 
context: if  person A spiked the drink o f person B, for the purpose o f enjoying the 
spectacle of person B becoming drunk, despite believing that person B had a medical 
condition that was particularly susceptible to alcohol and that she would get dangerously 
ill, we would hold person A folly responsible for the resulting illness. In each o f these 
cases -  in respect o f the hangover, the deaths, and the illness -  we feel instinctively that 
the agent is as responsible for these effects as for the means and ends o f the agent’s 
actions that preceded them (even if  we would consider those harms caused as means or 
ends to be morally worse -  a matter that will be addressed in later chapters).
This does in turn beg the question -  what is meant by foil responsibility? Strictly 
speaking, o f course, no one is folly responsible for anything — chance will always play a 
part. But Duff and Hart presumably mean something other than this. We react 
differently to people, and consequently ascribe different levels o f responsibility, 
depending on how much influence they exert over the results o f their actions. Later
30 Ibid, page 90.
31 The Times, 28 April 1868.
32 H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford, 1968, page 120.
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chapters will address this issue in more depth, but for the present it can be observed that 
harms considered to have been inflicted intentionally or deliberately generally warrant 
greater censure, and accordingly greater punishment, than those considered inflicted 
carelessly or accidentally. Someone who chooses to inflict harm may be said to be fully 
responsible for that harm; someone who chooses not to inflict harm but to do something 
that may result in harm may be held responsible for that harm, but not to the same degree; 
someone who chooses to do something that she does not believe creates any risk o f harm 
may not be responsible for that harm at all, unless it is thought that she should have 
appreciated that risk. If Mr Barrett’s choice to use dynamite necessarily, as far as he was 
concerned, entailed killing people, he should be held folly responsible for those deaths -  
just as responsible as if  he had wished them. That does not mean that those are the only 
moral considerations (such matters will also be addressed in later chapters). For the 
present, it is merely the purpose to establish a means o f accurately identifying and 
describing actions for which the agent ought to be held folly responsible -  for which 
harms she had chosen to inflict.
A number o f commentators have noted that the meaning o f “intention” and similar 
words is imprecise, and that the usage can very much depend on the user.33 It has also 
been noted that the law may justifiably bend such usage to its own ends, if  those ends are 
better served by doing so.34 However, it remains unsatisfactory that in dealing with the 
legal concept of intention -  which, in this thesis as elsewhere, includes consideration of 
much non-legal writing on the precise meaning of intention -  what is being discussed 
may not actually mean “intention” at all, as it is commonly understood.
Whether there mav be a more precise description
As noted in the previous section, “intentional” arguably has a wider meaning than 
“intended”. But can this be clarified? Are there any synonyms of these words that may
33 For example, see Nicola Lacey, “A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?”, Modem Law 
Review 1993,621. at page 627
34 John Gardner and Heike Jung, “Making Sense of Mens Rea: Antony Duff’s Account”, (1991) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 559, at page 579.
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assist in understanding these words? Do any such synonyms better describe the way in 
which harm is caused by agents who commit intention crimes?
Some dictionary definitions will be considered first, using two dictionaries.
In dictionary l 35: “Intentional” means simply “deliberate”. “Intended” means 
“planned or meant” .
In dictionary 236: “Intentional” means “done on purpose”. “Intended” means “1. done 
on purpose; intentional. 2. designed, meant.”
This does suggest, then, that there may be a difference between “intended” and 
“intentional”, although the difference is only hinted at, and cannot be said to follow 
necessarily. The synonyms for both words are deliberate, planned, meant, purpose, 
designed. The definitions of these words in turn refer to some of the others. Dictionary 1 
defines “deliberate” as “ 1. done on purpose. 2. careful, unhurried.” Dictionary 2 defines 
it as “1. intentional” and gives a number o f other meanings. So while understanding 
precisely what the words mean remains elusive, there are clear connections between 
them.
It seems to be the case that some of these words have what may be described as “hard” 
and “soft” meanings in common usage: “to have an intention to do something” can be 
different from “doing something intentionally”, in a similar way that “having a purpose to 
do something” can be different to “doing something on purpose”, and “deliberating to do 
something” can be different to “doing something deliberately”. Plans and designs, 
however, do not seem to have soft meanings: there is no adverbial form o f plan, and 
“designedly” retains the hard meaning of “design” -  for example, it seems particularly 
odd to say that the man who drank a bottle o f whisky designedly got a hangover, unless a 
hangover was one of his purposes.
Intentionally, deliberately, on purpose all seem to have potentially wider meanings 
than can be understood directly from what an agent’s intentions or deliberations or 
purposes were. O f these three, it is submitted that deliberately has the widest meaning in 
this context. That may be because the word “deliberate”, as noted in the dictionary 
definitions given above, has at least two quite different meanings. One is akin to
35
36
Paperback Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford, 2002.
Concise Oxford Dictionary, Oxford 1990.
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intentional, another is more precise -  “careful, unhurried”. The statement “she hit 
someone deliberately” can be interpreted in two distinct ways: firstly, that she hit the 
person on purpose or intentionally; and secondly, that she did so with care or precision or 
something similar. In the former sense, deliberateness does not require deliberation -  it 
might have been a rash reaction, without much thought being given to the action at all.
The Latin root of “deliberate” means to weigh. That implies choice, whether a 
carefully or hastily weighed-up one, and may explain why a “deliberate act” suggests 
either one that is merely chosen or one that is carefully administered, depending on the 
circumstances. The Latin root of “intention” means intention itself or plan or purpose. 
These roots may explain why “intentionally” is freighted with suggestions o f purposes, 
plans and desires, whereas “deliberately” is not, or not as much. That is why, if  Mr 
Barrett believed that people would inevitably die if his dynamite exploded (that he 
believed that the deaths were part and parcel of what he was doing), it seems to make 
more sense to say that he deliberately killed them, even though it was no part o f his 
intention (or plan or wish) that they should die, than to say that he intentionally killed 
them. Similarly, in another example discussed by commentators, the person who boards 
a plane that is destined for Manchester, in order to flee a particular place, and having no 
desire to go to Manchester, may be more readily understood as deliberately going to 
Manchester than as intentionally going there.
It is interesting to note that the latest work by the Law Commission that has 
considered intention (in the context of the law on homicide) sometimes uses the words 
“intentional” and “deliberate” as alternatives, as though they were similar ways of 
describing the same resulting harms, without explaining whether there is any difference 
between the descriptions. For example: “Murder is a crime centred on intentional or 
deliberate killing.. .”.37 The Consultation Paper goes on to analyse the problems posed by 
the differences between the ordinary meaning of intention as being “aim or purpose” and 
the wider meaning given to it in law, without considering what “deliberate killing” may 
mean, and whether that description might better serve the purpose for which “intentional” 
is used.38
37 Law Commission’s Consultation Paper No 177, page 32.
38 Ibid, pages 93 onwards.
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Elsewhere, deliberate actions are often used to describe what is meant by intentional 
actions, perhaps suggesting that the concept of deliberateness is simpler than that of 
intention. For example, A.P. Simester and G.R. Sullivan’s introduction to the concept of 
intention includes the following: “Both in law and in society at large, praise and blame 
are most obviously incurred for conduct that a person intends: D attracts greater censure 
if she deliberately breaks V ’s vase than if she carelessly drops it.”39
Are there any other viable options for describing this type o f action? Another 
possibility, and one that gets round the difficulties o f shades o f meaning discussed above, 
would be to use the word “knowingly”. The main problem with this option is that 
knowledge is a different concept than belief -  in particular, it requires at least that the 
agent’s belief is true, and possibly that it is justified. There may be other problems that 
substitution o f knowledge for belief might cause.40 Unfortunately the word “believingly” 
-  to the extent that the word has any currency at all -  does not mean precisely what 
would be required of it in this context (in that it means something akin to “credulously”).
This may all sound like quibbling, but it is submitted that the words used in these 
contexts do cause problems. And it is suggested that the use of the word “deliberately” is 
the word best suited to ascriptions of full responsibility, and avoids more problems than 
do the other words. It is admitted that the use of the word “deliberately” does not solve 
them all. For example, it may seem odd to say that the man who drinks a bottle of 
whisky deliberately gives himself a hangover. Where the consequence is causally far 
removed from, or otherwise distinct from, the desired result, the description “deliberate” 
can still seem too strained, albeit less strained than other descriptions. And the flipside of 
the distinction that has been identified between deliberateness and deliberation is that 
“deliberately” can suggest the latter, and so can cause confusion (however, properly used, 
it may be that this confusion can be avoided). No word fits the purpose perfectly, and 
“deliberately” seems the best suited, as it seems to have the widest application. It is also 
more commonly used in ordinary discourse than “intentionally” to describe consequences 
people cause through their actions.
39 Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, Oxford, 2003, page 126.
40 Stephen Shute considers these differences, and some of the problems of using knowledge rather than 
belief as the basis for mens rea, in “Knowledge and Belief in the Criminal Law”, in Criminal Law Theory: 
Doctrines o f  the General Part, edited by Stephen Shute and A. P. Simester, Oxford, 2002.
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Summary
The first section o f this chapter has endeavoured to show that belief is a necessary 
component of intention -  that no serious argument can be maintained against the 
contention that intention crime actions will always involve relevant beliefs. That does 
not mean that it is the only component, or that it is necessarily more important than any 
others. This chapter has also not come to any conclusions about what strength or type of 
beliefs may be required -  for example, whether and when beliefs as to possibilities, 
probabilities or certainties may be required. But it has, hopefully, established that belief 
is one o f intention’s essential building blocks, and accordingly needs to be understood if 
the mens rea of intention offences is to be understood.
The second section of this chapter has used this conclusion to assist in identifying an 
accurate description of all intention crime actions. While absolute precision may be 
impossible, it has been submitted that “intention” itself causes more problems than it 
solves. For the purpose of the rest o f the thesis, the words “deliberate” and “deliberately” 
will be used to describe all situations in which the agent chooses to inflict consequences, 
whether as means, ends, or side-effects.
Precisely what “belief’ is in this context and its moral significance in respect of 
intention crimes will be addressed in the chapters that follow.
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CHAPTER 2
IS “BELIEF” THE CORRECT TERM IN THIS CONTEXT? WHAT RELEVANT 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS MENTAL STATE CAN BE IDENTIFIED?
The previous chapter argued that belief, or some belief-like state, was a necessary 
feature o f the mens rea of intention crimes. It did not seek to identify what that mental 
state is. “B elief’ is the word usually used in analyses o f intention in this context. But 
before going on the consider the role that this mental state plays in intention crimes, it 
will be helpful to identify precisely what the state is -  whether it really is “belief’, and 
what relevant characteristics it has.
Whether belief is the relevant mental state
The relevant mental state considered in Chapter 1 is to do with our understanding of 
the environment around us at the time of, and in the particular context of, the actions that 
result from our intentions. Going back to the man on the firing range in Chapter 1, it has 
to do with such matters as whether he understands the gun to be loaded, what he 
understands will result from his physical actions in pulling the trigger, and what he 
understands he is aiming at. There are clearly words other than belief that could be used. 
As well as “understands”, we may refer to these mental features as, for example, 
perceptions or assumptions, or refer to them as being what someone accepts or considers 
to be the case.
Some commentators have argued that we should define and use such words more 
precisely, and restrict the use of words such as belief in these contexts. L. Jonathan 
Cohen, for example, has suggested that many of the mental states that may have been 
identified as beliefs are in fact “acceptances”, which differ from beliefs in important 
respects. The key difference, he stated, was that “Belief is a disposition to feel,
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acceptance a policy for reasoning.”41 According to Cohen, generally speaking, people 
can be held responsible for their acceptances, but not their beliefs42. If Cohen’s 
definitions are accepted, it may follow that only some of the relevant mental states for 
intention would be beliefs -  some would be acceptances. Not only would that pose 
definitional difficulties, it would also have an impact on an assessment of the moral 
significance of these states, not least because the degree o f responsibility that attaches to 
each is, according to Cohen, markedly different.
However, no agreement has been reached as to whether Cohen or others are right in 
seeking to adopt such restrictive definitions43. One of the reasons being that, as with 
intention, words such as belief and acceptance can mean different things to different 
people, and can even mean different things to the same people, given their uses in 
different contexts. A variety o f meanings of such words are valid within certain lexical 
constraints. While there may be some people who would prefer to use words such as 
acceptance or assumption instead of belief in respect o f the mental states being 
considered here, it seems unlikely that any definitive view could ever be reached about 
this.
So while it cannot be asserted with any confidence that belief is the correct word to 
use in the context o f the relevant mental state for intention, no sufficient body of opinion 
exists to suggest that another word should be preferred, and belief continues to be the 
word preferred by most writers on criminal law44. In any event, this thesis is only 
considering the importance o f the relevant state, not how it should be classified. In the 
absence o f compelling reasons for an alternative approach, “belief’ will be the word used 
for this mental state in all circumstances from now on.
41 L Jonathan Cohen, An Essay on Belief and Acceptance, Oxford, 1992, page 5.
42 Ibid, page 21.
43 Cohen’s analysis has been challenged by a number of commentators: see, for example, John-Pierre 
Dupy, “Choosing to Intend, Deciding to Believe” and David Clarke, “The Possibility of Acceptance 
Without Belief’ in Pascal Engel, ed., Believing and Accepting, Kluwer Philosophical Studies Series, 2000.
44 For example, it is the word used in the sections on intention in both Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, 
London, 2002, and A.P. Simester and G.R. Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, Oxford, 2003. 
“Belief’ (and, where facts are proved, “knowledge”, which has its own special problems, which are not 
considered here) is also the preferred word for this mental state in the statutory definitions of offences in 
English law.
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The rest o f this chapter will attempt to ascertain the relevant characteristics o f belief, 
which should clarify what is meant when the word is used in this context.
The meaning o f belief
There has been much dispute about what belief is, and what characteristics it consists 
of. Some of these arguments, and some of those characteristics, are of no relevance to the 
issues being addressed in this thesis. But there are a number of characteristics that are of 
relevance. They have an impact on whether, and to what extent, acts are deliberate, and 
whether, and to what extent, we can be held morally responsible for those acts. The 
following characteristics have been identified as of importance: 1) beliefs are subjective 
and internal; 2) beliefs are that their contents are true; 3) beliefs can be unconsciously 
held; 4) beliefs are generally involuntary; 5) a belief thatp, without more, is simply that 
p, not that possibly p, or that probably p , or that certainly p. These characteristics are 
considered below.
1) Beliefs are subjective and internal. Beliefs have to be distinguished from any 
objective or outsider’s account o f reality. A person’s belief can be irrational, outrageous, 
and even demonstrably untrue -  but still exist: a child may genuinely believe that Santa 
Claus exists; an amputee may genuinely believe he feels his severed limb.
This is an obvious point, but it matters as far as intention is concerned because there is 
a temptation to make assumptions about what other people’s beliefs should be in certain 
contexts, and fail to focus on what their beliefs actually are. Thus it may be tempting to 
assume that a person who, we think, has no chance o f hitting the thing she is aiming at 
cannot intend to hit it. But if  she believes she has a decent chance, and that is what she is 
trying to do, she does intend it -  she may be intending the impossible, but she is intending 
what she believes to be possible. The reverse is also the case: we may think she is aiming 
to hit something, but she may believe she has no chance o f hitting it, and may not be 
aiming for it (perhaps, for example, she is aiming towards it, making a gesture o f trying 
to hit it), and has no intention of hitting it.
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Similarly, because belief is an internal state, whose existence and character are known 
only to the agent, assertions o f belief by an agent may be indicative but are not conclusive 
of whether the agent has such a belief.
2) Beliefs are tha t their contents are true. If one believes that p , one believes it to 
be true that p .45
This proposition has been questioned in certain contexts. It has been argued that 
people are capable of believing things that they believe to be untrue -  for example, that 
they are capable o f self-deception, and can hide from themselves unpalatable truths46. In 
addition, attention has been drawn to irrational beliefs, which, it has been argued, the 
agent may be said to know to be untrue, such as the nervous insomniac’s thought that the 
house she is in is about to fall down, despite the evidence that strongly suggests 
otherwise47.
However, it may be that conclusions have been reached about these mental states 
without focusing sufficiently on the agent’s mental state itself. It is important to consider 
section 1 above in this context: beliefs are subjective, and we can be tempted to be too 
hasty to draw conclusions about other people’s beliefs. It is also important to isolate 
beliefs in time. There need be no rational inconsistency in believing something and later 
on believing the opposite, and moving backwards and forwards from such positions 
repeatedly.
Towards the end of Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited, one of the characters, Lord 
Marchmain, is dying. It becomes unclear to the narrator at one point whether Marchmain 
thinks he will recover or accepts that he will not. One o f the other characters, Cara, tells 
the narrator that Marchmain seems at times to accept, and at others not to accept, that his 
illness is terminal. Is it possible that Marchmain believes that he is going to recover 
while also believing that this is not the reality? (Note again section 1 above: it is
45 See Stephen Shute, ibid, page 183; and Bernard Williams, Problems o f  Self, Cambridge, 1973, pages 
136-137.
46 H. H. Price, in Belief, Humanities Press, London, 1969, at page 301 considered that people can believe 
that they do not have certain beliefs. Bernard Williams, ibid, page 149 onwards, considered it possible that 
one could persuade oneself to believe something that one knew to be untrue. Michael Losonsky, “On 
Wanting to Believe” in Pascal Engel, ed, Believing and Accepting, Kluwer Philosophical Studies Series, 
2000, at page 126, argued that we can persuade ourselves to believe things that are not true if  it assists us, 
especially in a social context.
47 Joseph Raz, in Engaging Reason, Oxford, 1999, at page 15, considered that such thoughts may not be 
beliefs at all.
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Marchmain’s beliefs that are relevant -  they may be different from what the narrator or 
the other character thinks his beliefs to be, and may be different from anything 
Marchmain himself asserts.)
Given this evidence, there appear to be several possible attitudes Marchmain may have 
to his illness that are not states of believing something that he believes to be untrue. 
There are at least four explanations. Firstly, Marchmain may not believe that he will 
recover, but may just want to believe it, seeking to put the reality out of his mind as much 
as possible. In this case, he believes that he is terminally ill. He may pretend to the other 
characters occasionally that he will recover, or he may prefer at certain times to think of 
other things, and carry on as though he will recover without consciously considering the 
reality o f his condition; but his belief that he is terminally ill remains (even if it is 
dormant -  see section 4 below). Secondly, he may not believe that he really is terminally 
ill, despite the apparently overwhelming evidence to the contrary, and despite what the 
narrator, the characters, and readers may think is the only rational belief to have about 
that evidence. He may have persuaded himself (selected the evidence in a particular way, 
for example) that he really will recover. He may make comments about dying 
occasionally, but he never, at this stage, believes that death is imminent. Thirdly, he may 
only have a partial belief that he is terminally ill -  for example, he accepts that there is 
significant evidence in favour of that conclusion, but still considers that there is a chance 
that he will recover. Fourthly, he may sometimes believe that he is terminally ill, and 
may sometimes believe that he is not. In none of these situations does Marchmain 
believe something that he believes to be false.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse such complex psychological phenomena 
in any depth. But it is surely the case that any fu ll  beliefs are those that the agent must 
believe -  at the time -  to be true. It is a logical impossibility for an agent fully to believe 
something while also believing that something to be untrue. Beliefs may be partial 
beliefs, and thus may admit o f a measure of uncertainty; and they may also change over 
time. Whether partial beliefs can ever be a sufficient basis for intention crimes will be 
considered at section 5 below and in later chapters, but it is submitted that, at least in 
most cases, intention crimes are based on full beliefs. It also ought to be noted that 
beliefs -  whether full or partial -  may waver: one can believe p  at one moment and
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believe not-p (or otherwise disbelieve p)  the next. But the mens rea o f intention crimes 
can depend on a belief held at one moment but not held at another: it does not matter, for 
the purposes o f establishing what the agent believed to be the case, whether there were 
different beliefs before or after the intention was formed.
3) Beliefs can be unconsciously held. At any one time, a person’s beliefs do not need 
to be consciously considered in order to exist48. Most beliefs may fall into this 
category49. Our appreciation o f what we understand the world around us to be consists o f 
a very large set o f beliefs that may be considered from time to time but generally lie 
dormant until triggered by some other thought or event50.
4) Beliefs are generally involuntary. This is a much-argued topic51. The assertion 
here is that many (perhaps most) beliefs occur without any act o f will. This would seem 
to be the case with perceptual beliefs: the evidence o f our senses provides information 
that we simply accept -  such as feeling cold. Such beliefs cannot, in any ordinary 
context, be accepted or rejected at will. Other beliefs may be more complicated, and 
seem to involve volition at some stage -  although it is disputed whether the final act of 
believing is voluntary or not.
Beliefs relevant to intention crimes are perhaps never complicated to such a degree. 
They do not result from decision-making processes, but rather from an appreciation o f the 
world about us -  beliefs such as, for example, I am holding a gun, it is loaded, I am 
aiming it at person P, etc. However, the process that leads to the forming o f beliefs -  
such as the mental conditions that we allow to exist and the attitudes to propositions that
48 See, for example, J. R. Searle, ibid, page 2; H.H. Price, ibid, page 42 and page 300; and Jonathan E
Adler, Belief's Own Ethics, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002, page 171 onwards.
49 See Daniel C. Dennett, ibid, page 55.
50 J. R. Searle (ibid, page 141 onwards) considered that a number of unconscious beliefs are not really 
beliefs at all, but could better be described as ‘T he Background”. Whatever they may be called, however, 
the fact that they are so important to our understanding o f the world means that they are relevant mental 
states equivalent to beliefs as far as criminal intention is concerned.
51 The debate takes in Hume and Descartes among others, and has not been settled. According to L. 
Jonathan Cohen, ibid, page 21, belief is always involuntary, and can be distinguished from “acceptance” 
partly on this basis. Bernard Williams (ibid, page 148 onwards) argued that belief is essentially 
involuntary, but that there are “roundabout routes” to believing at will. Michael Losonsky (ibid, page 103 
onwards) argued that although belief is involuntary, any process of inquiry that leads to it is not, on which 
basis it can be concluded that beliefs are the product of volition.
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we have -  are to some extent under our control52. The extent to which that matters 
morally will be considered in later chapters.
5) Belief tha tp , without more, is simply that p , not that possibly p , or that probably 
p , or that certainly p. In other words, if  one believes a proposition, without considering 
any qualification about the proposition, one simply believes in its truth, and one does not 
assign to that belief any degree o f probability or claim of certainty.
This issue has also been the subject o f much debate53. If I believe that it is raining, 
what do I believe about the probability or certainty that it is raining? It seems 
incontrovertible that I believe more than that it is only possibly raining -  more than the 
proposition that “there is more than a 0% chance and less than a 50% chance that it is 
raining”. But do I mean that I believe it is probably raining -  “there is more than a 50% 
chance but less than a 100% chance that it is raining” -  or do I mean that I believe it is 
certainly raining -  “there is a 100% chance that it is raining”? At the risk o f seeming 
perverse, it is suggested that I mean none of these. I simply believe that it is raining. I 
have not considered what the chances are. I have what Michael Bratman calls a “flat-out 
belief’, which is different to (and in a sense more than) a probability, but is not 
necessarily a 100% belief54.
If I formed the belief that it was raining by walking over to the window in my office 
and witnessing it apparently pouring down outside, and if, when I returned to my desk 
away from the window, someone said, “Was it raining?”, I might simply say, “Yes”. If 
the person said, “Are you sure?”, I might consider further and remember how it looked 
and sounded to be pouring, and say, “Yes, absolutely sure”. If  the person then said, 
“Well, didn’t you know that there’s an irrigation system that’s just been installed outside 
that makes it look like it’s raining out o f the windows?” At this point, my previous 
confidence may weaken, and I may say, “Well I’m not certain, but it didn’t look like 
irrigation -  I’d say it’s still most likely that it’s raining.” My last two assertions 
(“absolutely sure” and “most likely”) are based on different mental processes to my initial
52 See Jonathan E Adler, ibid, page 56.
53 Richard Swinburne for example, has argued that “Normally to believe that p  is to believe that p  is more 
probable than not-p”: Faith and Reason, Oxford, 1981, at pages 4 to 5. Jonathan E Adler(ibid, page 42) has 
argued that beliefs without any qualifications are full beliefs -  that is, beliefs as to certainty, not probability.
54 Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Harvard, 1987, page 36.
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one: the initial assertion is based on a simple yes-or-no belief -  a “flat-out” belief, 
involving no considerations of probability or certainty. Only when questioned did I go 
back to this simple belief, and analyse how confident I was about it, and firstly affirm my 
assurance, and then (given other evidence) qualify my considerations o f its probability.
Most beliefs we have are simple, full beliefs.55 Beliefs can be partial -  I can believe 
that something is probable or possible -  but these are beliefs qualified, or partial beliefs.
Can partial beliefs as well as full beliefs be sufficient in establishing intention? As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, it is important to distinguish between belief as to success and 
belief as to aim. Beliefs as to success can certainly be partial beliefs that are sufficient 
for intention -  one can believe that the chances o f success are probable, or only possible, 
but still intend the result. But beliefs about what one is aiming to do are different. If I 
believe that what I am shooting at is probably a dummy, but that it is possibly a person, I 
am not deliberately trying to hit someone: this, it is submitted, would amount to reckless 
killing if death resulted -  i.e. manslaughter. If I simply believe that it is a person, without 
qualification, I have the mens rea for murder. If I consider how strong my belief is and 
conclude that I am sure that it is a person, I also have that mens rea. But what if  I believe 
that it is probably a person, but I am not sure? From a moral or instinctive standpoint, we 
may feel that the mens rea for murder is made out. From a conceptual standpoint, we 
may have more trouble, because the aim o f the gunman is not clear -  he is not, according 
to his own beliefs, without doubt aiming at a person. This issue will be considered in 
more depth later.
Summary
In the absence o f any persuasive arguments to depart from convention, “belief’ will be 
the word used in this thesis to describe the relevant mental state for intention.
The following characteristics of belief have been identified as o f particular 
importance: 1) beliefs are subjective and internal; 2) beliefs are that their contents are 
true; 3) beliefs can be unconsciously held; 4) beliefs are generally involuntary; 5) a belief 
that p, without more, is simply that p , not that possibly p , or that probably p , or that
55 See Jonathan E. Adler, ibid, page 231.
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certainly p. These characteristics should assist in analysing the role belief plays in 
intention, and the moral significance that it has.
CHAPTER 3
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND INTENTION
The previous chapters have argued that belief, or some belief-like state, was a 
necessary feature o f the mens rea of intention crimes, and identified what that mental 
state is. The thesis will now seek to establish the particular moral context in which the 
importance o f belief is to be assessed, by identifying how the concept of moral 
responsibility is treated within the criminal law, specifically with regard to intention.
Does moral responsibility exist?
It has been suggested that people cannot truly be morally responsible for anything. If 
that was the case, it would seem pointless to make any inquires about moral significance. 
Arguments about this will not be addressed here in any detail. Instead, there will be a 
brief discussion of some o f them, in order to understand how the criminal law exists 
alongside or in spite o f them, and how intention, and the belief component o f it, can be 
understood in that context. The end of the chapter will consider what conclusions it may 
be permissible to draw about these arguments for the specific purposes o f this thesis.
1) Determinism. Determinism is the theory that every event has a cause. If the 
theory is correct, it is arguable by extension that every event is predetermined, and that 
there is no such thing as free will -  accordingly, we are not free agents, and there is no 
such thing as moral responsibility. This extended argument is sometimes referred to as 
“hard determinism”.
This is a problem that has exercised many minds for many years, and remains open to 
debate. Many philosophers have sought to reconcile determinism with moral 
responsibility by seeking to refute the extension to the theory described above -  a 
position sometimes called “soft determinism”. Others take issue with the concept of 
determinism itself. Some suggest that science has demonstrated or will demonstrate that
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hard determinism is correct.56 But as far as commonly understood morality is concerned, 
the hard determinist position is rejected. As Jonathan Glover has stated, “no one disputes 
that men sometimes choose to do things”57, and people do blame each other according as 
their (apparent) choices impact on others. We are more inclined to blame someone for 
apparently deliberately causing harm than for running a risk that led to that harm, and to 
exonerate when that person could not have chosen otherwise than cause the harm. The 
determinist may say that no one really has a choice, but as H. L. A. Hart has stated, ‘This 
is how human nature in human society actually is and as yet we have no power to alter 
it.”58
2) M oral luck. As Galen Strawson has said, “People do not make themselves to be 
the way they are.”59 How can people be blamed for actions that result from defects of 
character, when character is the result o f luck -  not something that the agent can choose? 
It may be no use rejoining that, whatever bad character traits we are bom with, we have 
the choice o f controlling the effect o f those traits, since the ability to exercise self-control 
is yet another aspect of our characters that we are bom with -  as is the willingness and 
ability to develop such self-control and otherwise be willing and able to leam to deal with 
those traits in other ways.
This problem is similar in some ways to that o f determinism. The central objection to 
the argument may be similar: we do make moral judgements about people (not just their 
actions), and that is the way human society is -  even if, on close inspection, it may be 
hard to justify the basis for those judgements.
3) Meaninglessness. A.J. Ayer stated that sentences expressing moral judgements “do 
not say anything. They are pure expressions o f feeling and as such do not come under the 
category o f truth and falsehood.”60 If such statements are not verifiable, does that mean 
that there is no such thing as objective morality? If  moral judgements are just matters of
56 For example, Richard Dawkins has said, in an article for www.edge.org, “What is your dangerous idea? 
2006”: “Assigning blame and responsibility is an aspect of the useful fiction o f intentional agents that we 
construct in our brains as a means of short-cutting a truer analysis of what is going on in the world in which 
we have to live.”
57 Jonathan Glover, Responsibility, London, 1970, page 16.
58 H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford, 1968, page 183. A number of commentators 
have made a similar point: see for example M. Fischer and M. Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, 
Cambridge, 1998, page 1.
59 Galen Strawson, Freedom and Belief, Oxford, 1986, page 95.
60 A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Pelican, 1971, page 144.
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personal preference, there may be no validity in assessing the moral significance of 
anything -  of claiming that any moral judgements are right or wrong.
A counter-argument might dispute that we can draw the conclusion that moral 
judgements are pure expressions of feeling. Ayer may be right about it, but how can 
anyone know? Furthermore, moral judgements are not solely individual affairs: groups 
of people can form a consensus about certain moral issues, and these conclusions can be 
(although are by no means always) similar in different societies. Even if  a condemnation 
of murder were nothing more than an expression of feeling, it may have a social validity 
and importance beyond questions of what can be said to be true and false in a logical 
analysis o f such a statement.
4) Social control. It has been objected that morality -  or at least, what any given 
society may accept as morality -  is nothing more than the means by which one set o f 
individuals seeks to exert control over another. “Every people has its own Tartuffery and 
call it its virtues,” Nietzsche wrote. “What is best in us we do not know — we cannot 
know.”61 It is arguable that whatever is referred to as morality is simply self-interest 
masquerading as something noble. Extolling religious virtues o f poverty and meekness 
may simply be a good way o f stopping the have-nots from rebelling against the haves. 
Laws concerning property benefit those lucky enough to have more possessions than 
others. The criminal law tends to be imposed by the rich on the poor. And against any 
claim o f the objectivity of moral standards, it is easy to point to differences in moral 
standards from age to age and country to country.
To all these objections it may simply be said that morality is an essentially social 
phenomenon62 -  that does not mean that it does not exist, or has no value. There are 
some moral values that more or less everyone agrees on, such as the prohibition against 
killing another person without lawful excuse. Other prohibitions, such as theft, may be 
harder to identify, agree on and justify, but are accepted by most people in some format 
as a necessary means o f social regulation.
61 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, section 249, in Friedrich Nietzsche, Basic Writings, The Modem 
Library Classics, 2000, page 375.
62 In our secular (or at least, not theologically driven) society, this seems to be broadly accepted. See, for 
example, H. L. A. Hart, The Concept o f  Law, Oxford, 1961, page 189 (itself taking its cue from Hume), J.
L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, London, 1977, page 42 onwards, and Philippa Foot, Virtues 
and Vices, University of California, 1978, page 189 onwards.
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Criminal law and moral responsibility
Whatever doubts philosophers and others have had about moral responsibility, human 
beings do tend to behave on the basis that it exists63. It is thus not surprising that the 
criminal law in England and Wales -  as in other jurisdictions — assumes its existence.64 
For this reason we have the concept o f mens rea: to be guilty o f crimes requiring mens 
rea, it is insufficient for the agent to be causally responsible for the harm in question; she 
must also be morally responsible — she must have a “guilty mind”. Not all crimes require 
mens rea: the criminal law includes a large number o f strict liability offences; but their 
existence is defended on the basis that their social necessity outweighs the potential 
injustice to the “innocent” offender -  moral responsibility may be excluded, but its 
existence is not denied. Most offences, and all the most serious, require a degree of 
moral fault, through the infliction of harm negligently, recklessly, or intentionally. 
Defences to crimes include categories called “excuses”, “justification”, and “mistake”, 
and specific defences such as “diminished responsibility” and “provocation” exonerate or 
mitigate on the basis of the existence, or level, of the agent’s moral responsibility for the 
harm caused.
This is not to say that law is to be equated with morality. There are many immoral 
acts that are not crimes, and crimes that are not immoral acts.65 Nevertheless, it would be 
uncontroversial to suggest that most criminal laws ought to punish only those who are 
morally responsible for the harms they cause. To punish otherwise -  at least, for the 
more serious offences -  would offend most people’s sense o f justice. That is why, in a 
country whose rulers rely to an extent on the consent o f its citizens in enacting and 
enforcing laws, there is a general requirement for mens rea, there are the gradations from 
negligence to recklessness to intention in attributing culpability in respect o f different
63 See Jonathan Glover, ibid.
64 As Thomas Morawetz states in his The Philosophy o f Law, New York, 1980, at page 202: “legal 
liability... presupposes that persons have control over their actions, that they have the capacity to act 
voluntarily and exercise free choice.”
65 H. L. A. Hart in The Concept o f Law, Oxford, 1961, page 153 onwards, identified a number of key 
differences between morality and any given set of legal rules.
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offences, and there are a number of defences based on the exclusion or limitation of 
moral responsibility.66
The place o f moral responsibility in the criminal law
It may be clear that moral responsibility is a key feature of criminal law, but how is it, 
and how should it be, dealt with? In administering criminal justice, there are 
considerations other than the degree of moral fault of alleged offenders. When and in 
what way does and should moral responsibility fall to be considered?
Perhaps most importantly, there is a tension between what may be considered the 
general objective o f crime o f minimising harm that people cause to others67, and the 
desirability o f doing justice in individual cases to reflect the degree of the agent’s moral 
responsibility. J. Rawls’ view was that the first -  utilitarian -  objective could justify the 
practice o f the system, whereas the second -  retributive -  objective could justify its 
application in particular cases.68 H.L.A. Hart proposed a similar justification.69 But 
even if this view is accepted, the tensions between the two objectives remain, and it is 
often the case that one objective gains at the expense of the other.
The criminal law strikes some sort o f balance between both objectives. Moral 
responsibility is a key feature o f most offences and many defences. That means that the 
identification o f moral responsibility plays a significant role at the conviction stage. But 
not everyone agrees that it should play such a significant role at that point. The most 
notable proponent o f an alternative approach in recent decades was Barbara Wootton.70 
Her view was that the conviction stage should establish only whether the defendant was 
causally responsible for the relevant harm. Issues o f moral responsibility should be 
relevant only at the sentencing stage, when the primary concern was find an appropriate
66 This point was also made by Hart: ibid, page 200 onwards.
67 In the House of Lords case of R v  Powell and English [1998] 1 Cr.App.R. 261 (the leading authority for 
the principle that a secondary party to murder need have no intention to cause harm), Lord Steyn said, “The 
criminal justice system exists to control crime.”
68 J. Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules”, page 105 onwards, in H. B. Acton ed., The Philosophy o f  
Punishment, London, 1969.
69 H.L.A. Hart, “Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment” in his Punishment and Responsibility, 
Oxford, 1968.
70 Barbara Wootton, Crime and the Criminal Law, 2nd edition, London, 1981.
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course o f action to prevent the defendant from causing similar harms again. Such an 
approach could lead to some very different outcomes to those we are used to, and 
probably even to those that Wootton would wish. The absent-minded driver may get life 
imprisonment; the one-off murderer may get nothing.
Few would go as far as Wootton. She herself backed away from the application of 
some of the results that her approach suggested -  for example, she recognised that mens 
rea had to be a requirement of certain crimes, such as theft. And she was not denying the 
existence of individual moral responsibility, or its importance in the criminal law: she 
accepted that the question whether harm is deliberately inflicted has important social 
consequences, but believed only that such questions were better dealt with at the 
sentencing stage rather than the conviction stage. So even a utilitarianism that goes this 
far -  and which goes much too far for most people -  still finds it necessary to make some 
compromises with our retributive instincts.
In contrast to Wootton, there are those who would like to see moral responsibility play 
a greater role at the conviction stage. There are also those who wish to take the debate 
beyond the traditional utilitarian and retributive arguments. The relative merits o f 
different theories o f punishments will not be addressed here. It can be observed, 
however, that the criminal law as it exists makes moral responsibility a condition o f most 
offences, and of all the most serious offences, and that even critics o f this recognise the 
importance of moral responsibility at some stage in the criminal justice process.
Intention and moral responsibility
One of the ways in which the criminal law makes moral responsibility relevant at the 
conviction stage is in stipulating that certain crimes require a relevant intention.
The reason for this seems rooted in the different human reactions to harms inflicted 
deliberately rather than otherwise. Whether or not it can be justified, deliberate harm 
tends to result in greater blame than non-deliberate harm, and accordingly results in
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severer punishment. This appears to be the way human beings have reacted for a long 
time.71
In the criminal law, intention found its way into the definition of certain offences in a 
haphazard way. As the mens rea for murder, for example, it grew out o f the common law 
requirement o f “malice aforethought”, and remains determined by the common law. 
Other crimes requiring intention, such as theft, are now governed by statute, but drew on 
the development of the concept in the common law. But in whichever way the concept 
arrived, it is plainly an accepted one now.
Under the current law, intention crimes are only committed if  offenders have aimed at 
the relevant harm, or at least foreseen it as a virtually certain consequence o f their actions 
(or the successful outcome of them). Intention is the most culpable form of moral 
responsibility in terms of the agent’s attitude towards, or appreciation of, harm. This may 
be because, traditionally at least, morality has been considered as essentially concerning 
choice: the degree to which actions are within our control72. Deliberate harm results from 
the agent’s choosing to proceed with a course of action that she believes will cause that 
harm, or at least will do so if her action is successful. Such an agent more definitely 
chooses the resulting harm than if she only risks causing it or causes it negligently: its 
occurrence is more within her perceived control.73 Intention is thus a moral concept: it 
distinguishes conduct by the extent o f an agent’s moral responsibility.74
Intention is required for many offences at the conviction stage. This is one aspect of 
the criminal law that differs from the system Barbara Wootton advocated. In particular, 
intention is required at this stage for the most serious offences, such as murder, serious 
assault, theft and rape. The criminal law thus recognises the importance o f distinguishing 
this aspect o f moral responsibility in determining what offence has been committed, not 
just what sentence may be appropriate. Tribunals -  usually lay tribunals of juries and
71 See William Kneale, “The Responsibility of Criminals”, in H. B. Acton ed., The Philosophy o f  
Punishment, London, 1969, page 180.
72 See, for example, Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Book III ii (Penguin Classics, 2004, pages 54-55),
and Hyman Gross, A Theory o f  Criminal Justice, Oxford, 1979, page 87 onwards.73 • • ,The differentiation between intention and other mens rea categories suggested here is considered in more 
depth in Chapter 5 below.
74 A detailed analysis of the link between intention and morality can be found in R. A. Duff, Intention, 
Agency and Criminal Liability, Oxford, 1990; in the particular context of what has been discussed, see page 
102.
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magistrates, rather than legal professionals -  have to decide such matters. These 
distinctions are therefore clearly considered socially important. It is not simply a matter 
of sentencing, determined by a judge, that, for example, distinguishes a reckless driver 
who kills from a person who kills for money; it is considered proper for a tribunal to 
convict the one of manslaughter and the other of the more socially opprobrious charge of 
murder.
Summary
The concept o f intention in the criminal law is grounded in morality, and it brings the 
question of moral responsibility into the conviction stage of the criminal justice process 
for those offences for which it is a requirement. Despite a number o f objections to the 
assumptions that moral responsibility exists, or can meaningfully be assessed, the 
existence o f the concept o f intention in the criminal law is clearly based on such 
assumptions. The arguments about those objections are unlikely ever to be resolved. But 
morality is a social reality. While acknowledging that the moral assumptions behind this 
reality may be hard to justify, it remains worthwhile analysing it on its own terms. Since 
belief is a necessary component o f intention crimes, and intention in this context is a 
moral concept, it remains worthwhile considering the significance o f belief in any moral 
examination o f intention crimes.
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CHAPTER 4
THE TYPE OF BELIEF AS A COMPONENT OF INTENTION
The first two chapters argued that belief is a necessary feature o f the mens rea of 
intention crimes and identified what precisely is meant by “belief’. The last chapter 
established how the concept o f moral responsibility is treated within the criminal law 
with specific regard to intention. This chapter will identify what role beliefs play in 
intention and what type of belief is required for such crimes, so that the remaining 
chapters can consider the moral role that it plays.
What role does belief play as a component o f intention?
In Chapter 1 it was observed that a relevant belief was always required in intention 
crimes. But precisely what role does it play, and how can its role be evaluated in a moral 
context? Can a person’s belief by itself be morally relevant to criminal intention, or does 
its moral significance derive in some other way?
In Chapter 2 it was observed that it is arguable that people could be held morally 
responsible simply for holding beliefs, even if those beliefs were -  to some degree, at 
least -  involuntary. It may be objected that someone should not be held morally 
responsible on the basis o f a belief if  it is involuntary
It is important to clarify what role belief plays as a component o f  intention, as opposed 
to what role belief may play in any other moral assessments o f intended action. Beliefs 
that are arguably immoral in themselves involve a value judgement. They include beliefs 
such as “all black people are inferior”, or “other people’s pain is o f no importance”, or 
“non-consensual sex is permissible”. Such beliefs are not the relevant components of 
criminal intention. As identified in Chapter 1, the belief required for deliberate harm is
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an attitude to the likelihood of the relevant harm occurring. Beliefs amounting to an 
opinion about such harms -  about whether, for example, the harms are excusable, 
justifiable, or do not matter -  are not the components of intention. They are still 
important beliefs in other contexts. Having immoral beliefs, or having no moral beliefs, 
at the relevant time will often feature when intention crimes are committed: they may 
help explain why such crimes occur, and may be relevant in considering the appropriate 
sentence. But they are not relevant in terms of the moral significance of belief as a 
component of intention -  which is what this thesis is exclusively concerned with.
To take an example, the contract killer whose modus operandi is shooting people in 
the head may have any number of immoral beliefs -  that his victims all deserve their fate, 
that he simply does not care, that anyone would do the same for the money involved -  but 
the relevant belief component o f the mens rea o f murder is that o f believing that his 
victims will die or suffer serious harm if his shots hit their targets. That belief is not 
immoral in itself, but acting on it will be.
Similarly, the beliefs that, for example, stabbing someone will cause them serious 
harm, or that by taking someone’s property away from them I will permanently deprive 
them of it, are not immoral. What is immoral, or may be, is acting on such beliefs. 
Morality in this context concerns the choice on which beliefs are made: I act immorally if 
I choose to do something despite believing that it will or may cause harm (or if  I should 
have realised that it may cause harm), and without good excuse.75
This thesis is therefore only concerned with beliefs as far as they inform us of the 
choices on the basis o f which we decide to act, and in that context, the morality o f beliefs 
themselves are irrelevant.
What type o f belief?
Having identified broadly what type of belief constitutes the relevant component of 
intention, some further clarification is needed about the characteristics o f such beliefs in 
considering what moral role it plays. The following contentions will be addressed in
75 A similar account of intentional harm is given by R.A. Duff in his Intention, Agency and Criminal 
Liability, Oxford, 1990, at pages 79-80.
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turn: 1) the belief concerns the successful outcome o f actions; 2) the belief is of virtu a lly  
certainty o f harm; 3) the belief is not unconscious; 4) the belief must be that held by the 
agent; and 5) the belief cannot be falsely held.
1) The belief concerns the successful outcome of actions. As noted in Chapter 1, 
the belief as to the chances o f the harm occurring is based on the successful outcome of 
an agent’s action. This point seems to have been overlooked on occasion.
The direction to juries on murder trials approved in R  v Woollin76 states that juries 
should be told, in the cases where a simple direction is insufficient, that the requisite 
intention can only be found if  “death or serious harm was a virtual certainty (barring 
some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions and that the 
defendant appreciated that such was the case.” Following that direction strictly, Smith & 
Hogan’s gunman (referred to in Chapter 1) -  firing without much hope o f success but 
trying to kill and succeeding -  would not be guilty o f murder. O f course, in fact the 
gunman should be guilty o f murder, and the reason is that he believes that death or 
serious harm is a certainty i f  his action is successful. Even if  his purpose was to practise 
his shooting, and the target happened to be a person, provided he believed that he would 
cause such harm he would still be guilty o f  murder -  because his foresight was that the 
harm was virtually certain to occur if his action was successful.77
The following passage from Glanville Williams alludes to this important requirement 
(underlining added):
[SJuppose that a villain of the deepest dye blows up an aircraft in flight with a time-bomb, merely 
for the purpose of collecting on insurance. It is not his aim to cause the people on board to perish, 
but he knows that success in his scheme will inevitably involve their deaths as a side effect78
76 [1999] 1 AC 82.
77 This is not to say that there are no moral differences between this scenario and one in which the aim was 
to kill, nor is it to say that the law would treat them in the same way. Such matters are considered in later
chapters.
78 From “Oblique Intention” (1987) 46 Criminal Law Journal, 417. The importance of the link between 
the belief about the harm and the success of the agent’s plan has also been acknowledged by Greg Taylor in 
“Concepts of Intention in German Criminal Law”, (2004) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 99 (especially 
at page 107).
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Deliberate acts require more than foresight of harm. Such acts are inextricably linked 
to the agent’s reasons for acting.79 This does not mean, however, that culpability only 
attaches to a harm connected to those reasons -  in Williams’s example, we still hold the 
deep-dyed villain fully responsible for the deaths of the passengers, and consider that he 
deliberately caused those deaths. But it does mean that foresight o f harm has to be 
considered in the context o f  the agent’s purposes: we consider that an agent deliberately 
causes harm if  she foresees that the harm will occur if  her action is successful. It is noted 
that the Law Commission has recognised this to some degree in its latest consideration of 
the mens rea for murder.80
2) The belief is of virtually certainty of harm . The law currently demands virtual 
certainty: R v Woollin. As pointed out in Smith and Hogan81, it is unfortunate that, in 
respect of murder at least, the law focuses on the fact of whether the harm was, 
objectively, a virtual certainty rather than exclusively on whether that was the agent’s 
belief. It is also unfortunate, as pointed out by J. C. Smith82, that a jury is only “entitled 
to find” intention in such a situation, suggesting that there may be situations in which 
they may not do so.83 However, virtual certainty remains the test, rather than probability 
or possibility. Something short o f virtual certainty had been the test for a number of 
years.84 The Law Commission has endorsed the current standard.85
Some believe that probability ought to be the test. The following example is often 
cited in support: a person sets off a bomb in a shopping area, gives a warning, but 
believes it is likely (rather than virtually certain) that those trying to defuse it will die.
79 A view endorsed by Joseph Raz in his Engaging Reason, Oxford, 1999, especially pages 47 and 231, 
and Donald Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, in his Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford, 1980, 
page 7. Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Harvard/London, 1987, especially 
|>age 32, made a similar point in connecting intentions with plans.
u Law Commission’s Consultation Paper No 177, especially at page 93 onwards.
81 Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, 2002, page 71.82 Commentary on R v Woollin [1998] Crim.LR. 890.
83 The Court of Appeal in R v Matthews and Alleyne [2003] Cr App R 30 subsequently ruled that “the law
has not yet reached a definition of intent in murder in terms of appreciation of a virtual certainty.”
84 Following the judgment in DPP v Smith [1961] A.C. 290 and a number of decisions after it.
85 Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences Against the Person and General Principles (Law Com No.
218), paragraph 8.13.
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Such a person should, it has been said, be guilty o f murder.86 It is easy to see why 
revulsion at a crime of that sort should prompt such a response. But that alone, it is 
submitted, is not sufficient to widen the definition o f intention. However recklessness 
and intention are categorised, it will be possible to find cases o f the former that are 
morally more reprehensible than the latter. That can be addressed by thoughtful 
sentencing. A better approach is to consider what difference is made when examples are 
considered all things being equal. With the terrorist example, it is submitted that there 
remains a significant moral difference between the person who believes it is more likely 
than not that people will die and the person who believes it is virtually certain that they 
will die (for example, by giving no warning). Admittedly, in this extreme example, the 
difference is not huge, but it exists -  and in other examples, the difference will be much 
greater.
However, it must be admitted that there is a fine line between what might be called 
“deliberate harm” and the deliberate exposure to likely harm. Some (like Lord Goff)87 
consider that there is no moral difference. The most prudent course may be to sit on the 
fence, as R.A. Duff has done88, and perhaps go further and accept that if  society considers 
that such harms are morally indistinguishable, so be it. But there are at least good 
practical reasons for keeping the virtual certainty test. Why should the test be more likely 
than not rather than, say, a significant risk? What about a straight 50:50 case? What 
about a defendant who gave no thought to the probability? How would juries be directed 
about it? It would be hard to establish a consensus and justification for the appropriate 
test.
And why should probability be the test, and not possibility? Antje Pedain and others 
have argued that since deliberate exposure to the risk o f harm is significantly morally 
different to indifference about that risk, the degree of probability is immaterial as far as 
establishing intention is concerned, which would allow a bare possibility o f risk to be
86 For example, Lord Goff, “The Mental Element in the Crime of Murder", Law Quarterly Review, 1998,
30.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid, page 95.
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sufficient, provided it was deliberately created.89 It is submitted that, while this correctly 
identifies the problems involved in making moral assessments based on levels of 
probability, distinguishing intention and recklessness on this basis is more clearly a step 
too far, and would lead to bizarre results. For example, a motorist who enjoyed driving 
fast because o f the thrill o f the risk o f an accident -  a risk she believed to be infinitesimal 
-  may be guilty o f murder, whereas a motorist who deliberately killed a pedestrian who 
stepped in front o f her car may only be guilty o f manslaughter. It is also submitted that 
there are significant conceptual and evidential difficulties in discerning an intention to 
create a risk, and distinguishing that from running a risk that happens to come one’s way. 
These difficulties have emerged in certain analyses o f murder cases such as that o f R v 
Hyam [1975] AC 55. In a recent article, M. Cathleen Kaveny90 argued that Mrs Hyam, 
who started a fire in a house, apparently with the purpose o f frightening the occupant, 
believing that there was a risk o f causing death, intended to create that risk, and so ought 
to be guilty o f murder. But that use o f “intended” raises familiar problems concerning 
the meaning of intention. Kaveny argued that the use o f the word “intended” in criminal 
law should not be strained beyond its ordinary meaning o f direct intention. But who 
intends to create risks, on the ordinary meaning of intention? Surely that is rare. (The 
reckless driver mentioned above may have such an intention -  but should she have the 
mens rea o f murder?) If Mrs Hyam’s purpose was to frighten, presumably she would not 
have cared in the least if  she believed that there had been no risk at all, provided the 
victim had believed there to be a risk, and was frightened as a result. It was the 
frightening that counted. It cannot be said that on the ordinary meaning o f intention, she 
intended to create the risk -  another straining of its meaning is required if it is to be used 
in this way.91
og
“Intention and the Terrorist Example” [2003] Crim.L.R. 579. See also Anthony Kenny, “Intention and 
Malice Aforethought” in his The Ivory Tower, Oxford, 1985, page 14, for a similar suggestion.
QO“Inferring Intention from Foresight”, (2004) Law Quarterly Review, 81.
91 Kaveny contrasted Hyam with other cases in which defendants would seem to have appreciated a 
likelihood of serious injury or death (R v Maloney [1985] AC 905 R v  Hancock and Shankland [1986] AC 
455), and stated that whereas each of the latter might only have intended to create an “apparent risk”, in 
Mrs Hyam’s case “the terrifying risks attendant on a blaze inside the front door was precisely what she 
planned” (at page 99). Kaveny did not provide any further explanation of how she came to these different 
conclusions.
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It is submitted that the conceptual and practical difficulties of lowering the threshold 
from virtual certainty outweigh those o f keeping it as it is. Although the language o f the 
virtual certainty test is a little hard to penetrate, the principle behind it is readily 
understandable, and it provides the clearest distinction between deliberate and reckless 
acts. As a compromise, it may be that in cases such as Hyam, and the terrorist example, a 
middle way could be found to include something such as “callous indifference to loss o f 
life”, either as alternative mens rea for murder under the current law, or as a new serious 
homicide offence (as proposed by the Law Commission92). But such killings do not seem 
to be deliberate. For all the above reasons, and in the absence o f any strong moral 
arguments to the contrary, it is submitted that the relevant belief should always be a “full 
belief’, or a “flat-out belief’, as identified in Chapter 2 -  a belief that the relevant harm 
will happen (if the action is successful) rather than may or will probably happen.93
3) The belief is not unconscious. As noted in Chapter 2, beliefs can be unconscious. 
It is submitted that as far as appreciating harm is concerned, in order to commit harm 
deliberately, the agent must be to some extent conscious o f the belief at the time of the 
action that causes the harm. However, this is a difficult point. A number o f beliefs 
associated with the awareness of the harm may be unconscious -  as noted in Chapter 1, 
someone firing a gun, for example, has a number o f unconscious beliefs about the 
physical act required to do so, and about what happens once the trigger is pulled, and so 
on. On the other hand, awareness o f the causing of harm itself seems to be something 
that is required in order for a deliberate act to occur: in order to choose to cause a result, 
one surely needs to be aware o f the possibility of that result.
Others would disagree with this last point. Hyman Gross, for example, takes the view 
that knowledge of the harm is not necessary at the time of the action that causes it, and 
gives the example of a counterfeiter who trains himself to think o f other things at the time 
that he passes counterfeit notes -  who ought still to be guilty.94 It may be argued against 
this that such a person may still have a relevant belief about the notes, albeit that he is
92 Law Commission Consultation Paper No 177 -  Overview, paragraphs 5.31 to 5.37.
93 Jonathan E Adler, in a general rather than a specifically criminal context, endorsed the view that 
intentional action was facilitated by full, rather than partial, belief: Beliefs Own Ethics, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 2002, page 232.
94Ibid, page 90 onwards.
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thinking predominantly of other matters -  a subconscious belief, perhaps.95 Another way 
o f considering such cases is to identify the action as spread over a longer period o f time 
than the physical act of passing notes96. The latter approach may be a way of 
understanding why the perpetrators in cases such as R v Church97 were properly found 
guilty o f murder.
There is a range o f different views on these matters98 *, and the psychological 
implications are beyond the scope o f this thesis. But it is submitted that the belief as to 
harm has to have been consciously, or at least subconsciously, considered, even if  only 
fleetingly." If an agent is unaware of the possibility of harm, she does not appreciate the 
moral nature o f her action, and should not, on a moral basis, be guilty o f an offence 
requiring an intention to cause that harm.
4) The belief must be that held by the agent. It was noted in Chapter 2 that there 
can be a temptation to assume, despite perhaps evidence to the contrary, that an agent 
must have believed something. Such a temptation should be avoided; For an intention 
crime it is the agent’s belief that is relevant. If the agent did not believe that harm would 
result from the successful outcome of her action, she could not have deliberately inflicted 
it -  she did not choose to inflict it. If she believed there was only the risk o f harm, she 
may be guilty o f a recklessness crime, and if  she did not believe there was such a risk but 
should have done, she may be guilty o f a negligence crime. In this respect, as noted 
above, it is submitted that the virtual certainty test in R  v Woollin is wrong. Inferences 
will have to be made about a defendant’s state o f mind in deciding cases (the fact that 
something appears obvious to the jury may be evidence that it would have been obvious
95 See Chapter 2, section 3), which considered the possibility that someone (Lord Marchmain in that 
example) may believe something while choosing not to think about it. Consider also the following example 
o f reckless driving: someone looks at her speedometer as she sets off down a busy shopping street and sees 
that it reads 60 m.p.h., makes no effort to slow down, but thinks about other things as she carries on and 
starts knocking down pedestrians. She may still be understood to be aware at that stage that she is
travelling too fast.
96 Action is not purely physical, and the identification of any act depends on how we choose to describe it:
see R. A. Duff, ibid, page 40 onwards and page 116 onwards.
97 f 1966] 1 QB 59. Death was caused while the attacker believed he was disposing of the corpse after a
fight.
98 As noted in Stephen Shute’s article “Knowledge and Belief in the Criminal Law” in Criminal Law 
Theory: Doctrines o f  the General Part, edited by Stephen Shute and A. P. Simester, Oxford, 2002, 
jjiagel98.
Glanville Williams endorsed a similar view in The Mental Element in Crime, Oxford, 1965, page 18 
onwards.
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to the defendant), and tribunals will never know for sure what that state o f mind was, but 
the test should not incorporate an objective element of what the defendant should have 
believed.100
5) The belief cannot be falsely held. This is to reiterate a point made in Chapter 2 in 
this context. Someone cannot believe p  and not-p simultaneously. She may believe the 
alternatives at different times, or believe something to a limited extent only. For 
intention crimes it is submitted that the agent’s own full belief concerning the harm is 
required at the relevant time. As has been discussed, identifying the relevant time may be 
problematical, but it must be closely linked to the action that results in the harm. For the 
same reason, it is submitted that “wilful blindness” -  shutting one’s eyes to the obvious -  
is not the same as belief.101 This is connected with the points made in sections 3 and 4 
above: the fact that to an outsider a certain belief is “obvious” does not mean it is obvious 
to the agent. If  it is obvious to the agent, that agent will believe it, because one cannot 
have a belief that one considers false. If it is not obvious to the agent, even if it should 
have been, the agent may not believe it, and even if that can properly be described as 
“wilful blindness” to the relevant harm, it is insufficient for an intention crime -  intention 
being, as has been noted, a subjective concept.
6) The belief need not match the harm , but m ust be proportionate to it. The belief 
about the harm that will occur does not need to match exactly the harm that does occur, 
but it has to be similar to it. In one type o f situation, the victim is different to the one 
believed to be harmed, and the doctrine of “transferred malice” applies: someone 
undertaking an action believing that A will be harmed, which actually results in B being 
harmed, is culpable notwithstanding that she did not foresee or wish any harm to B. In 
another type o f situation, the type of harm that results may be different to that envisaged: 
X believes that by stabbing Y, Y will die from her wounds, but instead Y suffers a heart 
attack on seeing the knife and dies anyway; X is still guilty o f murder. In a further type 
o f situation, the seriousness o f harm that results may be different: M stabs N believing 
that serious harm will result, and N dies; M is still guilty o f murder. On the last of these, 
the current law may be considered somewhat harsh in its attribution o f responsibility:
100 See Simester and Sullivan, ibid, page 138: “Intention is a subjective concept, and any inference made 
from the evidence is not a presumption.”
101 Further reasons for rejecting the doctrine can be found in Stephen Shute, ibid, page 196 onwards.
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someone can still be convicted o f murder even though death may not be foreseen as even 
a remote possibility. The application o f this principle tends to apply to assaults rather 
than other crimes. The harm envisaged must be to some degree proportionate to the harm 
caused: so murder cannot ordinarily be committed if only slight harm was foreseen. It 
may be that despite the apparent harshness, there are sound social reasons (and perhaps 
therefore sound moral reasons) for adopting to some extent the maxim “The stone 
belongs to the devil when it leaves the hand that threw it.”102
Summary
As far as the belief component o f intention is concerned, it is not the belief itself that 
attracts moral censure. The relevant belief is that harm will or may occur as a result of 
the agent’s action. The moral significance derives from the choice to act despite such a 
belief. The following properties of such a belief have been identified: 1) the belief 
concerns the successful outcome of actions; 2) the belief is of virtually certainty of harm; 
3) the belief is not unconscious; 4) the belief must be that held by the agent; 5) the belief 
cannot be falsely held; and 6) the belief need not match the harm, but must be 
proportionate to it.
102 Quoted approvingly in Jeremy Horder’s article, “Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens 
Rea”, (1997) Law Quarterly Review, 95, which considered the incorporation of the “malice principle” and 
the “proportionality principle” in the criminal law. According to Honder, the malice principle is that if 
someone wrongly directs her conduct at the interest of another, such malice may justify liability even if  she 
had no foresight of the harm caused; and the proportionality principle is that a person is liable for harm 
caused even if she did not appreciate that type or severity of harm, provided she foresaw some harm that 
was proportionate to it.
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CHAPTER 5
THE MORAL ROLE OF BELIEF AS A COMPONENT OF INTENTION
Chapters 1 to 3 identified that belief is a requirement o f intention crimes, analysed 
what “belief’ itself means, and considered the moral context in which belief plays a part. 
Chapter 4 identified what role belief plays and what type o f belief is required as a 
component o f intention. This chapter will consider what moral role belief has to play in 
intention crimes. The final chapters will compare it with other factors that may be of 
moral significance.
How does belief assist in defining intention?
Although Chapter 1 covered some of this ground, a little more about the definition o f 
intention is needed at this stage. That chapter suggested that intention crimes under the 
current law could best be described as being harms that were deliberately committed -  
harms that people choose to inflict. But is that how intention crimes ought to be defined? 
Are there more accurate ways of defining them?
Although what is meant by intention in the criminal law is hard to pin down, a clue to 
its meaning can be found by considering what distinguishes it from other mens rea 
concepts. Intention is contrasted in the criminal law with recklessness, negligence, and 
blamelessness. What attitude towards harm do these states o f mind require? It is 
submitted that, for any given harm, under the current law the position is roughly as 
follows: the agent intends the harm if she believes that it will occur if  her action is 
successful; she is reckless if  she believes that her action involves a risk o f that harm’s 
occurring, such risk being considered unreasonable; she is negligent if  she should have 
believed that her action involves the unreasonable risk of that harm’s occurring; and she
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is (generally speaking) blameless otherwise.103 It can be seen that on this account the 
agent’s mental state depends, at least to a significant degree, on differences in the agent’s 
belief about the harm. If the action of the agent is imagined as a gunshot, the victim of 
the directly or obliquely intended harm is believed by the agent to be directly in line and 
within range of his shot (the directly intended harm resulting from, for example, a wish to 
kill the victim; the obliquely intended harm resulting from, for example, a wish to check 
whether the gun works); the victim of the reckless harm is believed to be in the vicinity 
of, say, a randomly fired shot; the victim o f the negligent harm is not believed to be in the 
vicinity o f the shot but the agent did not bother to consider whether there were any people 
there when she should have done; the victim o f a blameless harm perhaps ran on a 
prohibited area of a firing range, unseen by the agent.
On this account of the differences, criminal intention can be morally distinguished on 
the basis that the agent understands a significantly closer connection between her actions 
and the harm that results than she does otherwise. It is more of her choosing. As 
identified in the previous chapter, under the current law she only commits an intention 
crime when she realises that the harm will (not may) result if  her action succeeds. Such 
an outcome is more within her control.104 It is this type o f action, it is submitted, that we 
think o f as constituting deliberate harm.105 And it is deliberate harm, whether it is 
categorised as intention or otherwise, that ought to be distinguished from reckless and 
negligent harm.
R. A. Duff adopts a similar distinction in his Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability, Oxford, 1990, at 
page 10, although he later concludes that in certain circumstances recklessness need not require the 
appreciation of the risk (page 157 onwards). The distinction offered here between recklessness and 
negligence is that given by C. L. Ten in his Crime, Guilty and Punishment, Oxford, 1987, at page 101.
H. L. A. Hart, in his Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford, 1968, page 119 onwards, identified the 
extent of an agent’s control as the key determinant of intention crimes.
A similar explanation to the one given here of the differing levels of culpability can be found in Hyman 
Gross, A Theory o f  Criminal Justice, Oxford, 1979, page 87 onwards. However, Gross identifies four 
levels, splitting what has been identified as intention here into two -  “intentionally” and “knowingly” 
causing harm, akin to direct and oblique intention. The moral differences between the two will be 
considered in the rest of the chapter and the following ones. It is worth noting here, though, that Gross 
considers “knowingly” causing harm as “intentionally doing what creates imminent danger of harm”, 
whereas oblique intention as understood under English law requires foresight of a virtual certainty of harm, 
rather than appreciation of only the danger of harm.
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But the theory advanced above is only one way o f accounting for the difference 
between these mens rea terms106. Some maintain that the difference between 
recklessness and intention is that recklessness requires the running of an unreasonable 
risk, whereas there is no test of reasonableness with intention.107 However, it is submitted 
that the requirement of unreasonableness for one and not the other mens rea term is in 
itself because o f the different scale of appreciation of harm: we all take risks o f causing 
harm, some o f which are unreasonable and some of which are not; but those who 
deliberately cause harm without good excuse necessarily act immorally. Driving a car 
always involves a risk of causing harm; the reckless driver is one who takes an 
unreasonable risk. But trying to knock down a pedestrian will necessarily be immoral, 
unless there is a good excuse for doing so (the pedestrian is aiming a gun at the driver, for 
example); without such an excuse that action will always be unreasonable. Thus 
deliberate harms are always prima facie unreasonable, and defining this mens rea concept 
in terms o f unreasonableness would be otiose.108
An alternative, or additional, way o f distinguishing intention from recklessness is to 
insist, as some commentators such as Lord Goff109 have done, that intention crimes 
require a purposive element, which is lacking in recklessness crimes. They claim that for 
mens rea to amount to intention the causing of harm must be a means to some purpose or 
an end in itself, as the ordinary meaning of intention suggests. In other words, only 
directly intended harms would amount to intention crimes.110
It ought to be noted here that some consider that negligence is not a category of mens rea, since, it has 
been said, there is no “guilty mind”. However, it is often treated as one, and there are reasons for doing so, 
since the lack of appreciation itself -  which is a state of mind -  is considered culpable.
107 For example, see A. P. Simester and G. R. Sullivan in their Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, 
Oxford, 2003, page 139. However, it is noted that later in the same work, Simester and Sullivan illustrate 
the difference between recklessness and intention with the example of someone having sexual intercourse 
recognising that the victim may not be consenting, which would amount to recklessness, and someone 
having sexual intercourse believing that the victim does not consent, which would amount to intention 
(page 144): this suggests rather that the key difference is the agent’s differing expectations of harm.
108 A view endorsed by J. C. Smith in “’Intent’: A Reply” [1978] Crim.L.R. 14, at page 20.
too
“The Mental Element in the Crime of Murder”, Law Quarterly Review, 1998,30.
110 It is submitted that Goff might have underestimated the uncertainties surrounding the meaning of 
intention. For example, he provided the following contrast: a person shooting through a window to hit 
someone intends to break the window, whereas in trying to blow up a parcel on a plane, which is likely to 
result in the death of the pilot, “I simply do not care whether he lives or dies.” (Ibid, at page 47.) On the 
face of it, it would seem that the gunman does not care about the breaking of the window either, but Goff 
does not provide any further comment on this.
So where would that leave “oblique intention” in the law? There would seem to be 
two alternatives: consider it as a form of recklessness, or give it a category on its own111. 
Lord Goff suggested that the Scottish concept o f “wicked recklessness” may be adopted 
to allow convictions for murder in certain such scenarios (such as a person who bombs a 
passenger plane for the insurance money). This suggests that oblique intention may be 
simply a more extreme version o f recklessness (which could be incorporated into 
intention offences in certain situations). One way of looking at this may be to say that the 
agent is simply taking a more likely, and more serious, risk o f harm.
Goff’s proposal, it is submitted, is essentially to get round the linguistic problems 
posed by intention. He considered that wicked recklessness could cover all certain 
consequences that were not directly intended, whether the agent envisaged the harm or 
not. The difficulty with the proposal is that in cases where the harm is envisaged, the act 
is not really reckless, since the agent believes that the harm is certain to occur if  her 
action is successful. The insurance bomber, in this scenario, believes that the passengers 
will die if  her bomb goes off: she is being more than reckless with their lives; she is 
deliberately ending them in the process o f enriching herself. If the harm is not envisaged, 
the act is not reckless either, since the agent believes that she is taking no risk at all, and 
should properly be considered negligent. The insurance bomber in this (hard to imagine) 
scenario cannot be said to be taking a risk, since she has not turned her mind to the 
possibility of the passengers’ deaths. The linguistic problems seem merely to have been 
switched from intention to recklessness.
Any deliberate action may, in literal terms, be described as taking a risk (a “sure-fire 
risk”) and that goes for directly intended harm as well. Recklessness, and risk-taking, 
ordinarily understood mean something other than this. One is more than reckless when 
one believes that something is virtually certain to happen as a result o f one’s actions.
If there is to be any value in distinguishing intention specifically from recklessness, it 
is submitted that the latter cannot include actions foreseen as virtually certain.112 For 
there is a moral distinction undeipinning the linguistic differences, and it can be 
understood in a non-legal context. If someone hit me and admitted afterwards that she
111 As it is given in the Model Penal Code, which separates “intentionally” from “knowingly” (Hyman 
Gross, ibid, page 82).
112 A view endorsed by J. C. Smith in “’Intent’: A Reply”[1978] Crim.L.R.14.
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knew she was going to hit me, but explained her action as practising her boxing, and said 
that my head just happened to be in the way o f her left hook, I would consider her action 
more than reckless -  and worse than reckless. I might (but would not necessarily) think 
even worse o f her if  I believed that her true purpose was to hurt me. But even if I 
believed that her purpose genuinely was to practise her boxing I would nevertheless 
consider that she had deliberately hit me, and think of her action in a quite different way 
than if  she had been careless.
And how do we classify an action where the purposes are uncertain? When Hamlet 
kills Polonius, his precise purpose may be unclear -  who did he believe was behind the 
arras, and why did he strike? But it is submitted that his prima facie guilt o f murder is 
established because (despite claiming he did not know what he had done) it is obvious 
that he believed his actions, if  successful, would result in death. He might under our 
criminal law be able to argue diminished responsibility, or (less likely) provocation, or 
(less likely still) insanity. But the “rash and bloody deed” is actually more than rash, and 
more than reckless: he deliberately killed, and that conclusion can be deduced directly 
from his belief about the harm he caused. Those that believe intention crimes should be 
restricted to purposive acts would demand of a jury that it should establish precisely what 
Hamlet’s purposes were -  which even he might have been unclear about. Instead, it is 
submitted that the mens rea for murder is established because we recognise that the act 
was a deliberate killing, whatever motives lay behind it.
We take avoidable risks of harming others on a regular basis -  such as every time we 
drive a car. Some risks are beyond the ordinary, are considered unreasonable, and 
amount to recklessness. But deliberately causing harm is o f a different order. As noted 
above, causing such harm is always unreasonable, unless there is an absolute excuse for 
it, such as self-defence. To put it in Kantian terms, the right of an individual not to be 
used as a means towards someone else’s ends is more clearly and more severely infringed 
if harm is deliberately rather than carelessly inflicted. Many philosophers have agreed 
that morality is particularly concerned with human will and moral choices.113 It follows
113 The following philosophers appear to have accepted this, for example: Aristotle (in The Nicomacheart 
Ethics, Book III ii: Penguin Classics, 2004, pages 54-55), Aquinas (in Quaestio Disputata de Caritate, 2, he 
agreed with Augustine that “sin is a fault of will”: Selected Philosophical Writings, Oxford World’s 
Classics, OUP, page 422), Descartes (in the Dedication to The Principles of Philosophy, at VIIIA, 3: Key
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that the more the will is directed to the harm, as is the case with deliberate harm 
compared to reckless harm, the more the agent will tend to be culpable.114
It is for this reason that oblique intention must be distinguished from recklessness. It 
must either be classified as intention or given a separate classification. And it is 
submitted that this distinction is for sound moral reasons. An agent who acts believing 
that harm will result if  her action is successful naturally and rightly attracts greater 
' opprobrium than one who acts believing only that it may result. Thus the concept o f 
intention is distinguished from recklessness and negligence on the basis o f the different 
beliefs o f the agent, and there are good moral reasons for doing so.
Intention as commonly understood may indeed mean something other than the 
meaning ascribed to it in the criminal law. But the concept o f intention should be used to 
describe what the law requires of it, rather than to shape the law to best fit its precise 
meaning. As argued in Chapter 1, “deliberate” may be a better way of describing the 
relevant harms in this context. But if  intention is used to describe all those criminal states 
of mind not captured by negligence and recklessness, it must include oblique intention.
Attempts
It might be objected that the above analysis o f the classification o f intention crimes 
appears weaker when considering attempt crimes. While it is easy to understand how 
directly intended crimes can be attempted, since the purpose of the action is clearly linked 
to the relevant harm, it can be harder to imagine how some obliquely intended crimes 
could be attempted. For example, in the example given earlier in the chapter o f harm 
obliquely intended from a gunshot (the purpose being, for example, checking whether the 
gun works), it may be hard to understand how attempted assault or attempted murder
Philosophical Writings, Wordsworth Classics, 1997, page 275), Hobbes (in Leviathan, Part I, Chapter 15: 
Penguin Classics, 1985, at page 206), Kant (in Grounding fo r  the Metaphysics o f Morals, First Section: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1993, page 7 onwards), J. S. Mill (in Utilitarianism, II, second footnote: On 
Liberty, Oxford World’s Classics, OUP, 1998, page 150), and R.M. Hare (in The Language o f Morals, 
Oxford, 2nd Edition, 1961, page 1).
114 . . . .
William Wilson, in his Central Issues in Criminal Theory, Oxford, 2002, page 135 onwards, especially 
at pages 139-140, endorsed this as a fundamental social distinction that needed reflecting in the way 
offences were punished. It seems that Wilson would, however, disagree with the way in which deliberate 
harm has been distinguished from recklessness in this thesis.
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could result from such a scenario. It has been argued that “generally, what agents do 
intentionally, they attempt to do”115, and it may be argued further that the difficulties of 
imagining attempted obliquely intended harms indicate that criminal intention should 
only encompass directly intended harms.
This is not the place to discuss the law of attempts in any detail. However, while it is 
true that the ordinary meaning of the word “attempt” is strained when describing some 
obliquely intended actions, it is submitted that there is no moral difficulty in ascribing the 
same degree o f moral responsibility and a similar level of punishment for an action in 
such circumstances as for an attempt at a similar directly intended harm. While the 
person firing the gun at someone is not strictly speaking attempting to cause the person 
harm, as part o f what she is attempting to do that person will invariably be harmed if her 
action is successful. She is in a physical sense aiming to hit the person.116 From a moral 
perspective, she is choosing to cause harm just as much as if  she directly intended the 
harm.
It would be very rare that someone would be convicted o f an attempt in such 
circumstances; because o f the absence o f harm and the difficulties o f establishing motive, 
the evidence is unlikely to support it. But in rare cases where the evidence may support it 
-  such as an attempt by a plane bomber trying to collect the insurance on the plane, where 
the preparatory actions and the motive may be clearly established -  there seems no reason 
why attempted oblique intention offences should not in principle exist.
Summary
Belief always has a central moral role to play in defining intention crimes. It is not the 
moral quality o f the belief itself that is important, but rather the fact that an agent chooses 
to act in a particular way despite the belief that harm will occur if  the action is successful. 
Without that belief, a crime cannot properly be distinguished from one committed
115 Jennifer Hornsby, “On What’s Intentionally Done”, in Action and Value in Criminal Law, edited by 
Stephen Shute, John Gardner, and Jeremy Horder, Oxford, 1993, at page 58.
116 It is admitted that in other examples of obliquely intended harm there will not be as clear a physical aim 
as there is in this example. However, it is a useful figurative example for obliquely intended actions 
generally, and another example of shooting will be referred to in the next chapter for similar reasons.
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recklessly or negligently. All such harms caused, whether by direct or oblique intention, 
should be distinguished from those committed recklessly or negligently. That distinction 
is important, because we react differently to harms caused deliberately rather than 
otherwise, and ascribe different levels of responsibility accordingly. It is for that reason 




OTHER FACTORS OF MORAL IMPORTANCE
Chapters 1 to 4 set about defining the terms with which and the context in which the 
moral significance o f belief could be assessed. Chapter 5 concluded that belief is always 
of central moral significance in intention crimes. In order to establish what degree of 
significance it has, this chapter will consider the moral significance o f other factors 
involved in intention crimes.
Factors other than belief that mav have moral significance in intention crimes
This section will consider, firstly, what components other than belief are necessary for 
intention crimes, and secondly, what other factors may be of moral significance.
1) Necessary components. Although there are other ways o f describing these 
components, it would be uncontroversial to suggest that an intention crime will, broadly 
speaking, always consist o f the following: an act, directed by an agent’s will, desiring that 
something, such as a particular objective, will result, and believing that the causing o f the 
relevant harm will result if  that action is successful.117
The act itself tends to be thought o f in purely physical terms, although it has been 
argued that it is partly comprised o f a psychological element.118 That psychological 
element would in itself, it seems, be the product some of the remaining components (the 
will, desire, and belief). The pure physical act — the bodily movements -  would seem to 
have no moral significance on its own.
The agent’s will -  the choice o f the agent in acting in that way -  distinguishes 
voluntary acts from involuntary acts. Involuntary acts may be, for example, mere
117 A similar identification o f the relevant mental components involved in killing someone can be found in
Michael Moore, Placing Blame, Oxford, 1997, at page 407.
118 See for example Anthony Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability, Oxford, 1990, page 41 
onwards.
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reflexes, such as flinching from pain. There is some debate at the margins between these 
descriptions119 — are actions such as breathing or something done while sleepwalking, 
voluntary or involuntary? — but such matters do not need to detain this inquiry. The 
question for now is whether the willing itself is a moral factor. It was argued in previous 
chapters that the choice an agent makes despite a belief about the harm caused is the 
reason that belief is morally significant -  for example, I decide to fire a gunshot in a 
certain direction despite my belief that if I am on target someone will die. There is a link 
here between will and belief. Both are necessary. Not willing the act (because, for 
example, I had no control over it) or not believing that any harm would result (because, 
for example, I was unaware of the risk of any harm) should amount to a defence for any 
intention crime. Will is also closely connected to desire: whenever someone acts, she 
does so for a reason120, and that reason springs from a desire (or some other “pro­
attitude”121). Will cannot exist without desires and beliefs, and once will has been 
established, beliefs and desires are necessary features o f it and can explain it. To take a 
simple example: suppose someone hits another person. If the action was the result o f a 
reflex -  the assailant had just been stung by a bee -  there may be no will and therefore no 
relevant belief or desire associated with the action. If the action was willed -  the 
assailant reacted to an insult -  there would have been a belief about what the action 
would achieve if  successful and a desire (for example, to revenge the slight). Even if  the 
desire was not closely connected with the harm caused -  perhaps the assailant wanted to 
show off her boxing technique -  there was nevertheless a relevant desire associated with 
the action. Associated desires and beliefs are therefore required for an action to be 
willed. Although in some senses the will can be considered as a separate component, it 
can be explained psychologically, or at least morally, by reference to the agent’s beliefs 
and desires.
The remaining component, and, it would appear from the preceding analysis, the most 
important leaving aside belief, is desire.
119 For example, see Michael Moore’s essay “More on Act and Crime” in his Placing Blame, ibid.
120 “Reason” is used in its wider meaning here -  as something that could be rational or »rational.
121 Such as a reason to do something: see Donald Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, in his Essays 
on Actions and Events, Oxford, 1980. It is not proposed to get into the debate here about whether all 
reasons require desires, which may anyway be beyond rational inquiry: see Philippa Foot, Virtues and 
Vices, University of California, 1978, page 156.
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There are, as has been acknowledged, different ways o f identifying the components of 
intention. However it is done, though, most commentators agree with the result of the 
analysis above that the key moral components of intention crimes are belief and desire.122
2) O ther factors. The factors other than components of intention that may be 
considered o f moral relevance to intention crimes are almost limitless. The particular 
character, history and situation o f the defendant, the relationship with the victim, the 
involvement of others -  a range o f such factors will often influence the moral response to 
particular crimes. Some of these factors will often influence the severity of the sentence, 
and some may afford defences or partial defences. Unlike belief or desire, such factors 
are not considered relevant to the question whether the mens rea o f intention crimes is 
established initially. Nevertheless they can be at least as important morally as the 
defendant’s component belief or desire. We may, for example, consider a hungry 
penniless person who steals some food significantly less blameworthy than a hungry 
millionaire who does so because he despises giving money to people of a particular race -  
a judgement that is based on the characters and situations those people are in, rather than 
their component beliefs or desires at the time of committing the offences.123
However, since it is not normally argued'that such factors should assist in determining 
the mens rea o f intention crimes, consideration o f these factors will wait until the next 
chapter, when the relative moral significance o f belief, desire and other factors are 
considered in the moral context within which the criminal law operates.
The rest o f this chapter will accordingly concentrate on the moral importance of 
desire.
122 See, for example: Donald Davidson, ibid, page 6; Michael Moore, ibid, page 411; Glanville Williams, 
The Mental Element in Crime, Oxford, 1965, page 20; and A. R. White, “Intention, Foresight and Desire”, 
(1976) Law Quarterly Review, 569, at page 590.
123 Non-component beliefs and desires may be important in such a judgement. For example, the 
millionaire’s beliefs about race may be relevant, but such beliefs are not components of the relevant 
intention.
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The moral significance o f desire in intention crimes: a necessary and/or aggravating 
factor?
As noted above, an intention crime will always result from an agent’s voluntary 
action, which in turn always involves an agent’s desire or other “pro-attitude” (the word 
“desire” will be used for present purposes, since it is the word most usually used in this 
context). There has been much debate on the moral importance o f the connection 
between the desire and the harm caused.
It is because some consider this connection of particular importance that they consider 
there to be a moral distinction between directly and obliquely intended crimes. In this 
connection, the “doctrine o f double effect” is often invoked. One version o f that doctrine 
is as follows:
According to this principle, there is an important distinction between what you aim at, either as one 
of your ends or as a means to one of your ends, and what you merely foresee happening as a 
consequence of your action. It is much worse, for example, to aim at injury to someone, either as an 
end or a means, than to aim at something that you know will lead to someone’s injury. Doing 
something that will cause injury to someone is bad enough; but according to the principle of Double 
Effect, it is even worse to aim at such injury.124
In fact this description may be too simplistic for some supporters o f the doctrine. If 
the basis for the doctrine is the closeness of the connection between the desire and the 
harm, the moral difference is not simply between directly and obliquely intended harms. 
In particular, desiring the harm itself as an end may be worse than desiring an end that 
involves harm as a means. So according to Michael Moore, for example, the person who 
bombs a passenger plane to get the insurance money from the destruction o f the plane 
(oblique intention) is not as immoral as the person who bombs it to get the insurance on 
the passengers’ lives (direct intention), but the person who bombs it simply because he 
hates the passengers (also direct intention) is the most immoral of all.125
124 G. Harman, The Nature o f Morality, Oxford, 1977, page 58.
125 Michael Moore, ibid, page 451.
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In fact, those that agree that the doctrine does provide an important rule or signpost for
moral distinctions sometimes disagree about the reasoning underpinning it. Philippa
Foot, for example, considers that the doctrine itself does not justify the differences, and
that justification depends on different duties that are owed in different circumstances.126
Warren Quinn disagreed with that analysis, and considered that the doctrine was based on
the injunction against using other people as means to one’s ends.127 128 J. L. Mackie
considered that there may be practical reasons for the moral distinction -  for example, a
harmful side-effect may be more avoidable in terms of what the agent is trying to do, so
that she may be hoping that the harm will not occur -  but concluded that the doctrine did
|*0.
not apply in all situations. Some o f those who believe that there are such moral 
differences concede that it is difficult to justify.129 In addition, supporters o f the doctrine 
admit that it does not apply in all situations.130 In another camp entirely, there are those, 
such as H. L. A. Hart, who consider that there is nothing, or very little, of moral 
significance in the distinctions at all.131
There is, therefore, a range of views about the doctrine. However, the prevalent view 
is that the doctrine does have some valid moral application, and that it, or something 
associated with it, justifies the following distinction: that when harms are desired, or 
when the harms are the means to some other desires, actions causing such harms are (or 
are sometimes) morally worse than actions that cause harms as side-effects.132 This 
seems to go straight to the heart of the issue whether intention crimes require a relevant 
desire as well as a relevant belief. A few examples will now be considered to examine 
this further.
126 Ibid, page 27 onwards.
127 Morality and Action, Cambridge, 1973, especially page 170 onwards.
128 Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, London, 1977, page 161 onwards.
129 _See for example Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Oxford, 1986, page 183.
130 See, for example, Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices, University of California, 1978, page 22; and J. 
Boyle, “Who is Entitled to Double Effect” (1991) 16 The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy ,475, cited in 
the Law Commission Consultation Paper No 177 at page 113.
131 Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford, 1968, pages 122-124. Glanville Williams also considered that, 
at least as far as the law was concerned, there should be no moral difference recognised between means and 
consequences: The Sanctity o f Life and the Criminal Law (1958, Carpentier Lectures at Columbia, 1956), 
286, quoted in the Law Commission Consultation Paper No 177.
132 The importance of the doctrine was recognised (albeit essentially rejected for the purposes of 
establishing criminal intention) in the Law Commission Consultation Paper No 177, paragraphs 4.72 to
4.91.
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Example 1: the plane bombers. As noted above, Michael Moore considered there to 
be significant moral differences between the following plane bombers (labelled for 
convenience A, B and C): Bomber A wanted the insurance money from the destruction of 
the plane, Bomber B wanted the insurance money from the deaths of the passengers, and 
Bomber C simply wanted the passengers dead.
It is submitted that many people would consider there to be no moral difference 
between any of the bombers. They may take the view that deliberate unjustified killing is 
equally bad in any situation, all other things being equal.
Others may consider that there are moral differences, but not on the basis o f whether 
the harm caused was a side-effect, means or end. Some may consider that killing through 
anger is worse than killing through greed. Some may consider the opposite.
On the other hand, some may find the distinction between ends, means and side- 
effects morally important, quite apart from the issue o f motives. But it is submitted that 
most people in this group would be likely to consider there to be a greater difference 
between Bomber C as against Bombers A and B, than between Bombers A and B -  if, 
indeed, they considered there to be any difference between A and B at all. If  this is 
correct, why might it be so?
Those who find C more reprehensible than A or B may consider that while killing 
people for gain is clearly immoral, killing people for the sake of killing is worse -  is 
particularly barbaric, sadistic, depraved, or something similar.133 Perhaps this 
differentiation may make sense if we imagine'considering each of the bombers in the 
other scenarios. We can imagine Bombers A and B swapping roles without difficulty -  
given their attitude to the destruction of life if  it results in their financial gain, they are 
unlikely to be worried precisely how the money is made. But we would be surprised if A 
or B would swap with C, if  in C’s scenario there was no financial reward in blowing up 
the plane. Bomber C, however, would be happy to swap with either A or B, and bomb 
anyway, whether there was a financial gain or not.
This example suggests that we do, or some o f us do, take desires into account when 
attributing moral blame. But it also suggests that whether and how we take them into
133 Moore stated that the desire to kill or torture or disfigure “for the sheer joy of it seems rather 
paradigmatic of true evil”: ibid, page 408.
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account is not clear-cut, and may depend on the circumstances. The moral difference in 
this example between directly and obliquely intended harm appears slight or even non­
existent, whereas (if there is a difference at all) there appears a greater difference between 
the two types of directly intended harm.
Example 2: the Strategic Bomber and the T error Bomber. These examples have 
been referred to by a number of commentators.134 The Strategic Bomber targets a 
munitions factory, expecting that in doing so a nearby school will be destroyed and all its 
pupils will die. The Terror Bomber targets the school itself, also expecting that all the 
children will die. According to the doctrine of double effect, the Terror Bomber is the 
more culpable, since she is aiming to kill the children -  she is using their deaths as a 
means to the end of (for example) winning the war.
According to Michael Bratman, the difference between the two can be understood by 
recognising that they have different plans: the Strategic Bomber’s plan, unlike the Terror 
Bomber’s, does not include the deaths of the schoolchildren, and those deaths may be 
avoided if the plan can be accommodated to do so.135 136
On the other hand, A. P. Simester has stated that as far as the criminal law is 
concerned, such distinctions may not be important. In certain circumstances there maybe 
a greater need to deter the Strategic Bomber (such as if  her chances of success are greater 
than that of the Terror Bomber), and thus it may be unwise to distinguish in absolute 
terms between them. Simester also notes that in neither case does the bomber desire the 
killing of the children itself -  a point similar to that made in respect of the plane bombers 
in Example 1) above. He further makes the point (also made in Chapter 5 above) that in 
the case o f both scenarios, the agent chooses to inflict the harm.
The fact remains, though, that all things being equal, many people would consider 
there to be something worse about the actions o f the Terror Bomber than those of the 
Strategic Bomber. Why might this be? It is maybe because we think that the Strategic 
Bomber is in some sense less willing for the children to die. Perhaps she has considered
134 For example, Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Harvard/London, 1987, at 
page 155.
3 Ibid, page 155.
136 “Why Distinguish Intention from Foresight?” in Harm and Culpability edited by A. P. Simester and A. 
T. H. Smith, Oxford, 1996, page 71 onwards.
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the destruction o f the munitions factory as a viable way to win the war she is fighting, but 
would not have considered killing children as a means to do so. She starts out, perhaps, 
with a less ignoble aim than the Terror Bomber -  it is only later that she realises, 
regretfully, that children will die as a consequence. The Terror Bomber, on the other 
hand, starts out thinking about killing children as a way o f securing her objectives -  
something we consider in itself objectionable.
But note that a number o f assumptions are being made here: other factors have been 
fed into the scenarios. In the scenarios described, the Bombers have a choice -  target the 
munitions factory or target the school. We are less likely to sympathise with the Terror 
Bomber in such a scenario -  we would rather target the munitions factory if  we were put 
in such a position, and we find it abhorrent if  someone would rather target the school. 
But what if  the starting positions were different? Consider the following different 
scenarios: the Strategic Bomber had been told that the only means of winning the war 
was to target the factory, and the Terror Bomber had been told the only means o f doing 
so was to target the school. The only desire in both instances may be the winning of the 
war. If we felt that the objectives of the war were morally sound (say, the defeat of Nazi 
Germany), then rather than being inclined to condemn, we might feel sorry for each of 
the Bombers, and in equal measure, having been put in such a moral dilemma. But if  we 
then found out that the Strategic Bomber did not in fact regard it as a moral dilemma at 
all and had no qualms about what she did, but that the Terror Bomber agonised and tried 
to find some other solution before reluctantly going ahead, having been convinced that 
the war could not be won otherwise, we may feel more moral sympathy for the Terror 
Bomber.
Whatever the scenario, in neither case, as Simester noted, is there a desire to kill 
children. There may be a difference between the attitudes o f the bombers in the 
connection between the desire and the harm caused -  that connection may be considered 
more remote in the case o f the Strategic Bomber (since what she is doing is directed at 
the munitions factory rather than the school). And it may be that that causes a difference 
in our moral reactions to the directly and obliquely intended harms. But the scenarios 
need to be fleshed out first in order to decide this. It is no use here simply stating that “all 
things being equal” the Terror Bomber is the more culpable: the circumstances can be
64
equal in different ways, as suggested above. So while there may be something in (or 
connected to) the doctrine o f double effect that affects our reaction, such a reaction is 
likely to depend on other factors.
Example 3: the Doctors’ Dilemmas. There are many examples o f medical dilemmas 
used to examine the doctrine o f double effect and related issues. Although some o f these 
are not necessarily scenarios that fall within the ambit of the criminal law, they may help 
to illustrate the moral differences being discussed. Here, three situations will be 
considered, all concerning patients with terminal illnesses: 1) Doctors with limited 
resources take the decision to stop treating one patient and use the resources instead to 
treat five patients. 2) Doctors find a new gas that, if  successful, will save five patients. 
Unfortunately, the only way of testing it to see if it works in time is to try it on another 
patient who they know will die as a result. They decide to go ahead anyway. 3) Doctors 
find a gas that will save five patients. Unfortunately, those patients cannot be moved 
from their ward, which is adjacent to a ward holding a patient who also cannot be moved, 
and whose disease they know is so sensitive to the fumes that she will die when it is used. 
They decide to go ahead anyway.137
The point of these scenarios is to examine why we find the first acceptable and the 
others unacceptable. The difference between the first two could be explained by the 
doctrine o f double effect: in scenario 1), the deaths are foreseen, but are not means to an 
end; whereas in scenario 2), the people killed are used as means towards an end. But as 
Philippa Foot has observed , in scenario 3) the deaths are not a means but a side-effect: 
nevertheless we feel it is similarly unacceptable. The patient is still being used. It is 
similar with the plane bombers in Example 1): whether the insurance covers the people or 
the plane, we feel it is equally (or very nearly equally) unacceptable, whether people are 
used as a means or just used as part and parcel of what is being done.
Nevertheless, is there some moral difference between scenarios 2) and 3)? Some may 
feel that killing people in order to do something or by targeting those people or 
deliberately using them is still worse than foreseeing that they will die as a result of the 
agents’ actions. As suggested previously in Example 2), this is perhaps because we
137 This last scenario is borrowed from Philippa Foot’s Virtues and Vices, University of California, 1978, 
page 29, and it has been adapted for the second scenario.
^3 ibid.
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imagine that those involved have the deaths more in mind at the outset: perhaps the 
doctors in scenario 2) conceive o f the death of the patient earlier in their thinking, rather 
than as something that occurs after their initial planning. However, again, this appears 
not to be to do with desire as such: none of these doctors want anybody to die -  in fact 
their desires are quite the reverse and in themselves perfectly morally sound, in that they 
simply want to save lives. It is the disregard for the individuals’ rights to life that we 
condemn in scenarios 2) and 3). There may, again, be a difference in these scenarios 
between the closeness o f the desire and the harm caused. But it is submitted that the 
moral difference between them, if it exists at all, is slight.
Example 4: the callous markswoman. The markswoman chooses to practise her 
shooting by aiming at a see-through human-shaped target. As it happens, a person who 
has a similar shape to the target stands within the outlined figure. In the first scenario, the 
target is between her and the victim. She believes that if  she hits the target she will hit 
the person who is standing behind it. In the second scenario, she takes aim from the 
opposite direction, so that the victim is between her and the target: she can still see where 
the target will be, and believes that a successful shot will hit the person first and be o f 
sufficient velocity to travel through that person and hit the target on the other side. 
Diagrammatically, the markswoman’s belief about a successful shot can be imagined in 
each case as following the path o f each direction o f the arrow below: in the first scenario 
the markswoman is shooting from left to right, in the second scenario she is shooting 
from right to left.
t a r g e  t v ict im
►
With the first shot, the markswoman believes that, if  successful, she will hit the target 
without hitting the person first, but that hitting the person will be a necessary 
consequence o f doing so. With the second shot, she believes that, if  successful, she will 
hit the person first -  hitting the person is a necessary means to hitting the target.
66
According to the doctrine of double effect, it would appear that the markswoman’s 
action in the second scenario is morally worse than her action in the first. That, it is 
submitted, would be a bizarre conclusion, and one that most people would be unable to 
understand or agree with. If the scenario was altered so that the markswoman was a 
soldier and the target was in fact another human being (who was to be killed for some 
morally acceptable reason), and there was no way of avoiding killing the innocent 
bystander from whichever direction the shot came, it does not seem to be morally 
preferable for the soldier to take aim from one direction rather than the other. Examples 
such as this are perhaps rare, but suggest that the doctrine is not of universal application. 
And as has been noted, some supporters o f the doctrine do agree with this.
The example may also suggest that, whatever scenario is being considered, we hold 
people similarly responsible for harms committed along the line o f the arrow (in 
whichever direction) in the diagram, unless other moral considerations are relevant. This 
is a diagrammatic means of what has been described in this thesis as “deliberate harm”. 
When an agent aims at a particular result, she may expect that, if  successful, a number of 
other results will happen at the time, or before or after it, either as a means to achieve it or 
as side-effects of it. All results on the line of the arrow are results caused deliberately -  
i.e. those results that the agent has chosen to cause, and for which she should be held 
fully responsible. As Hyman Gross stated, “motives differ from intentions in that 
motives are the source o f power for the act, while intentions supply the direction”, the 
one supplying the spring and the other the aim.139 This diagrammatic line o f full 
responsibility -  along which lie all results an agent believes will occur if  her action is 
successful -  can be used to demonstrate whether an intention crime has, prima facie, been 
committed. Whether particular results may be morally more reprehensible than others 
may depend on factors apart than their place on the line.
i * q
A Theory o f Criminal Justice, Oxford, 1979, pages 107-108.
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The moral significance of desire in intention crimes: a justificatory or excusatory 
feature?
Certain desires may provide defences to intention crimes, or are at least connected to 
such defences. An agent who believes that harm will result from her actions may be 
acting for good reasons that outweigh the fact that harm is caused. This suggests that 
intention crimes are not to be ascertained only on the basis o f the agent’s beliefs. To take 
two examples: if  someone deliberately kills another in a fight, the killer may be guilty o f 
murder unless the action was caused in self-defence (or whatever other defence may be 
relevant); the person who deliberately cuts off another’s arm may be guilty o f a serious 
assault unless she is, for example, a surgeon performing a legitimate operation. As stated 
earlier in this thesis, deliberate harm is only morally acceptable if  there is a lawful excuse 
for it.
It should also be noted that the relevant desires in this context are socially acceptable 
ones. There is thus an objective evaluation o f whether such desires amount to 
justifications or excuses, even though there is a subjective assessment o f the agent’s 
particular beliefs and attitudes in that context. So while the reasonableness of the amount 
o f force used to repel an attack (or imagined attack) must be judged on the agent’s 
perceptions, and is thus subjective to that extent, the existence of self-defence as a 
defence at all is objective. The person who believes it is morally acceptable to castrate a 
serial rapist may genuinely desire justice, but if  she carried out such an action it would 
constitute an intention crime notwithstanding that good, if  seriously misguided, desire.
So even the desire for something morally good can result in the committing of 
intention crimes. To take an extreme example to illustrate this further, imagine that a 
religious fundamentalist believed that the world was so corrupting that anyone growing 
up in it now would be certain to spend the eternity o f an afterlife in hell. Imagine further 
that this person believed that the only way to ensure that as many did not suffer this fate 
as possible was to kill babies in maternity wards so that they could go straight to heaven. 
She believed that she herself would go to hell for her actions, but was prepared to accept 
that. The slaughter that followed might, on her own account, have occurred for very 
noble motives: at the cost of her own eternal torment she was saving others from a fate
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literally worse than death. The desire itself was the preventing of others’ pain and the 
securing of their happiness. But that would not and should not, o f course, be a defence to 
murder.
The account offered so far in this section gives desire a role to play as defences to 
intention crimes. However, according to some, including supporters of the doctrine of 
double effect, in certain circumstances desire can act to negative any intentional harm 
being committed in the first place.140 It has been suggested for example that the reason 
that surgeons are not be guilty of intention crimes is because they are acting from good 
motives -  they do not desire the harms they cau.se, but rather seek improvements in their 
patients’ health, or an alleviation of their pain 141. While this is true to an extent, it is 
submitted that this is not the whole answer. Would or should a surgeon who sought to 
improve patients’ health (and was perfectly competent at her job) but actually enjoyed the 
harm she caused to her patients be guilty of assault -  and, if  any patients died, o f murder? 
The answer is surely not, even if such a desire could be proved.
It is worth also considering the flipside of that example. What would our response be 
if someone disguised herself as a surgeon and managed to get into an operating theatre 
and amputate some limbs, acting throughout with the desire to cure the patients? Such a 
person would and should be guilty of assault (albeit that the sentence may take into 
account the misguided motives o f the impostor).142
The reason we differentiate between the surgeon and the impostor is that surgeons and 
other medical staff who are authorised to operate on people have, in effect, a special 
social dispensation that operates as an automatic defence to intention crimes, provided 
they work within agreed parameters (which can, o f course, be difficult to define): they 
have a rebuttable permission to cause the harms that occur, because society recognises 
that such harms are brought about for the purpose o f preventing or curing greater
140 See for example J. Finnis, “Intention and Side-Effects” in R. G. Frey ed., Liability and Responsibility 
(1991), page 32 onwards, quoted in the Law Commission Consultation Paper No 177.
141 See, for example, Anthony Kenny, “Intention and Malice Aforethought”, in The Ivory Tower, Oxford, 
1985, page 14.
If one of the patients died, would this be murder? It is submitted that it should not, provided that death 
was not foreseen as a virtual certainty, because it is not a deliberate killing -  but of course the mens rea for 
murder is currently wider than this, and includes an intention to cause serious harm, which may be satisfied 
in this scenario. This is one of the instances in which that mens rea appears too wide. Manslaughter would 
be more appropriate, since the agent took an unacceptable risk of killing someone.
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harms.143 14This is strongly linked to the notion of causing harm for good reasons, but it is 
more complicated than that simple notion suggests. People have rights not be used by 
others, even if the motives of the users are virtuous. This is why the doctors in two of the 
scenarios in Example 3) above were morally culpable, even though their desires -  to save 
lives -  were morally sound.
There are other situations where harm is caused for the purpose o f preventing greater 
harm or suffering for that same person, or to prevent harm to some other person. For 
example, it may be morally permissible to shoot someone dead who is screaming in 
agony and clearly burning to death. There is also the case of R v Steanem , in which the 
defendant made propaganda broadcasts for the Nazis under threats of being sent with his 
family to a concentration camp. Defences of self-defence, necessity and duress are not 
sufficiently developed under the criminal law to cater for these and many such 
scenarios145, but it is submitted that there is no reason why they should not be extended to 
cover them.146 In each such case a proscribed harm has been caused, and in cases where 
a. good (or adequate) motive can be established, such defences ought to be available; but 
if  such a motive cannot be established, the deliberate causing o f such a harm should be 
punished. It seems preferable to provide specific defences for the few occasions when 
good motive can excuse deliberate harm, than to muddy the conceptual waters and 
complicate mattes in practice by altering the definition o f deliberate harm by which 
offences are prima facie established.
Thus “good” desires can be relevant in terms of establishing whether an intention 
crime has been committed, but such desires are only relevant in particular situations, and 
are not enough on their own.
143 A similar conclusion was reached by the Law Commission, citing the analysis of I. Kennedy and A. 
Grubb, Medical Law: Text and Materials (2nd ed. 1994), that a doctor may be excused deliberately causing 
death in certain circumstances not by virtue of the doctrine of double effect but “because the law permits 
the doctor to do the act in question”: Law Commission’s Consultation Paper 177, page 117.
144 [1947] KB 997.
145 The case of Re A [2001] Crim.L.R. 400 has arguably developed the defence of necessity, and 
demonstrates how it may be possible for such defences to be developed generally, whether, as in that case, 
through the common law or -  as may be preferable -  by statute.
146 It was noted by William Wilson in his Central Issues in Criminal Theory, Oxford, 2002, page 152, that 
the criminal law does attempt to use these three defences in this way. Wilson considered that using such 
defences ignored the problems posed by the meaning of intention. However, it is submitted that the 
adoption of the concept of deliberate harm advanced in this thesis would remove these problems.
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Bevond the doctrine of double effect
A significant part o f this chapter has addressed the doctrine o f double effect. That has 
been necessary partly because the doctrine has been much discussed in the context of 
intention over the last few decades. This chapter has suggested that it has -  or may have 
-  some moral relevance to intention crimes. But some of the examples considered also 
suggest that its importance in this context has been overstated. It appears that only 
sometimes might it have any relevance at all -  as some o f its supporters will in fact 
concede. And even when it is relevant, there may well be other factors that will be of 
greater moral importance.
Desire as a component may be of importance beyond the question of whether the 
relevant harm is a means or consequence. As has been noted, it may be that the degree of 
closeness the desire has to the harm is more pertinent. While in certain circumstances the 
harm as a means will be closer to the desire than the harm as a consequence, sometimes 
(as in the markswoman example) there will be no real difference between them. And 
some may consider that there is a greater moral difference between, on the one hand, a 
harm willed for its own sake and a harm used as a means, than on the other, a harm used 
as a means and a harm that occurs as a consequence. In other words, there may be a 
sliding scale o f culpability depending on how close the agent’s desire is connected to the 
harm, rather than the simpler dichotomy of direct intention and oblique intention 
suggested by the doctrine o f double effect.
But focusing on the doctrine may also obscure the fact that desire is not just important 
in terms o f its closeness to the harm, and is not important purely in terms o f whether a 
particular desire is “good” or “bad”. Firstly, the nature o f the desire often affects the way 
we react to harms caused by other people. Secondly, the judgements we make about such 
desires tend to depend on the particular circumstances in which the harm is caused, and 
through which that desire is understood.
To take an example, the person who enjoys torturing an innocent child to death is 
considered particularly immoral not only because her desire is very close to the harm 
caused, but also because she chooses to inflict it on a particularly vulnerable person,
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without apparently any excuse. On the other hand, if  a parent o f the victim becomes 
clinically depressed when the murderer fails to be convicted despite conclusive proof of 
guilt, and the parent kills the murderer, and derives great satisfaction from doing so, she 
would not be considered as blameworthy -  while we still recognise the need to censure 
such an action severely, we can sympathise with the perpetrator to some extent, and 
consider that her situation may provide some mitigation for her actions. Both wanted to 
cause pain, but the second offender has some excuse, whereas the first had none. In 
addition to the presence or absence of excuses, factors other than the desires may have 
significance in terms of our reaction, such as the relative age, vulnerability and innocence 
o f the victims.
Summary
Desire has been identified as the other relevant component in intention crimes apart 
from belief. The following points can be drawn from the analysis of the importance of 
desire:
• There will always be a desire prompting the action that results in the harm. However, 
the closeness of the connection between that desire and the harm can vary 
significantly.
• The doctrine o f double effect may be o f relevance in determining the degree of 
censure in certain circumstances. However, it is not always relevant, and even when 
it may be, its importance can be slight.
• Nevertheless desire is often a relevant factor in determining how we react to 
deliberate harm. It may play a part in determining whether we consider particular 
deliberate harms intention crimes at all -  albeit only a part. Desire can also be 
relevant in determining what level o f censure we consider appropriate -  albeit that 
there are often other relevant factors involved.
• The closeness of the desire to the harm caused, the nature of the desire, and the other 
circumstances in which that desire arose, can be more important than the question of 
whether the harm was directly or obliquely intended.
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CHAPTER 7
BELIEF COMPARED TO OTHER FACTORS
Chapter 5 concluded that belief was a morally important component of intention 
crimes, but Chapter 6 concluded that there are many situations in which desire is also 
morally important, and that there can be a number of other relevant factors, depending 
very much on the nature of the offence. This last chapter will consider the moral 
significance of belief compared to these other factors, given the moral context within 
which the criminal law operates, as identified in Chapter 3.
Placing the moral relevance of the belief component in the criminal law
Chapter 3 concluded that the concept of intention brings the question of moral 
responsibility into the conviction stage of the criminal justice process for those offences 
for which it is a requirement. Subsequent chapters have identified that the key morally 
distinguishing feature o f an intention crime is the deliberateness o f the agent’s action, 
which depends on the belief component, and establishes the extent of the agent’s 
responsibility. But precisely what role should the belief component play in deciding 
what, if  any, punishment is appropriate for such crimes, and how can its role be justified 
morally? It can play a role in two places: in determining whether a crime has been 
committed at all, and in determining the appropriate type and level of punishment. These 
will be considered in turn.
1) W hether an intention crime has been committed. The preceding chapters have 
identified that in the criminal law intention crimes are distinguished from other crimes on 
the basis o f the belief component (albeit that the test of “virtual certainty” is somewhat 
ambiguous about it). They have suggested that there is good reason for this, in that 
people do distinguish morally between deliberate and non-deliberate actions. Chapter 6 
concluded that desire, while being a necessary feature o f any action, was not one that
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needed to be directed to the harm concerned in order for the agent to commit deliberate 
harm. It was argued that desires and other factors may nevertheless be o f moral 
significance. They may provide, or be linked to, defences. It may also be appropriate for 
their significance to be reflected at the sentencing stage, once deliberate harm without 
lawful excuse has been established.147 However, it is submitted that the belief component 
rather than a desire component should determine whether a particular crime had been 
committed. A consideration o f some intention offences may help to demonstrate why 
this makes moral sense.
Commentaries on the concept o f intention have spent much more time on murder than 
on other intention crimes. It is for this reason that in considering particular intention 
crimes this thesis has focused on murder, and that offence will be considered first below. 
But if  the concept of intention is to be consistent throughout the criminal law (which, 
absent any compelling reasons to the contrary, it is submitted it should be), it is important 
to consider how any interpretation of intention may work with other offences. There are 
a large number of other intention crimes: two of them will also be considered -  theft and 
rape.
Murder (and other assault crimes'). Some commentators would like the distinction 
between murder and manslaughter to be based, at least in part, on desires148 (and at least 
one even has mistakenly believed that it is149). But Chapter 6 concluded that it was 
doubtful that most people would agree that the law should allow deliberate killers to be 
excused from charges o f murder on the basis that their desires were sufficiently at 
variance with their actions. It could result in people discussed in earlier chapters, such as 
Mr Barrett, the plane-insurance bomber, and the callous markswoman, escaping 
convictions o f murder. To equate these killers with reckless killers, such as dangerous 
drivers, is not only conceptually awkward, in that their actions are more than reckless, but 
also feels morally wrong. The alternative is to identify a separate class o f homicide for
147 Some support for this proposition can be found in H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility.
Oxford, 1968, at page 122, and John Gardner and Heike Jung: “Making Sense of Mens Rea: Antony Duffs 
Account” (1991) Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies 559, at pages 580-581.
148 For example, Anthony Kenny: see “Intention and Malice Aforethought”, in The Ivory Tower, Oxford, 
1985, page 14.
149 J. R. Lucas, in Responsibility, Oxford, 1993, at page 50, stated: “There is a moral difference between 
what I deliberately set about achieving and what happens as an unwanted consequence of my action or 
inaction. Manslaughter is bad, but murder much worse.”
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oblique intention crimes. But that seems a pointless complication, given that there is no 
good reason to believe that there is a clearer moral difference between directly and 
obliquely intended harms than between other types of deliberate harms (such as between 
premeditated and instinctive killings). There may also be practical difficulties in 
instituting laws that require establishing criminal desires.
The issue of whether and how “bad” and “good” desires can be used to categorise 
homicide offences was considered in the previous chapter. It should also be noted here 
that some commentators consider that certain oblique intention homicides should not be 
classified as murder in the absence of a desire. One example given is as follows: 
someone who works in a chemical factory does not secure chemicals on the site at the 
end of her shift because her employer tells her not to; she believes that by not doing so it 
is virtually certain that one of the children who always play on the site afterwards will 
touch the chemicals and suffer serious bums; and a child indeed suffers such bums and 
dies as a result. It has been suggested that it may be right to give a jury “moral elbow 
room” to convict such a person of manslaughter rather than murder.150 In another 
scenario, a motorist turning a bend on a mountain road is confronted with a group of 
hikers in the road; she has only two options -  to hit them or to veer off the road into the 
valley to her probable death; and she chooses the former, resulting in a hiker’s death.151 
It has been suggested that the mental element of murder is satisfied, and that it may be 
appropriate to allow a consideration of reasonableness to determine the issue. In both 
these cases, it is submitted that although the mens rea of murder may be theoretically 
satisfied on the virtual certainty test, there is no actus reus for the mens rea to bite on. In 
the chemical case, the worker did not put the chemicals in a dangerous position while 
believing that as result there was a virtually certainty that they would cause harm. In the 
driving case, the driver did not do anything to the car while believing that there was a 
virtual certainty that as a result the car would cause harm. In each case it is arguable that 
the person concerned was culpable of an omission that caused the harm, but even leaving
150 This is taken from the Law Commission’s Consultation Paper 177 (Overview) “A New Homicide Act 
For England and Wales?”, page 12. It is perhaps worth noting that the worker does not in fact appear to 
believe it to be a virtual certainty that a child will die, since he envisages a group playing, and only one of 
them suffering harm, which suggests only a risk (albeit perhaps a serious one) of harm. But this may 
simply be a mistake.
151 William Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory, Oxford, 2002, page 155.
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aside the problems of causation, neither person appears to be under a legal duty to act: 
liability for omissions is only imposed where defendants are under such duties.152 It 
therefore appears that it is the absence of an actus reus, rather than of a particular desire, 
that renders each person innocent of murder.
Alan Norrie has suggested, in considering decisions of the Court of Appeal and House 
of Lords on oblique intention, that there may be other reasons why oblique intention may 
not, in certain scenarios, be sufficient to establish murder.153 He distinguished the cases 
of, on the one hand, R v Moloney154 and R v Woollin155 from, on the other hand, R v 
Hyam156 and R v Nedrick157. In the former cases, Norrie stated, there was no “moral 
animus” between the killers and their victims: “Moloney felt affection for his stepfather. 
Woollin had seemingly never harmed his baby before.” In the latter cases (in which the 
defendants set houses on fire), there was “no redeeming aspect in the moral relationship 
between the parties.” Norrie thus suggests that certain crimes would not amount to 
murder because there would be an absence of “moral animus”. It is submitted, however, 
that there are good reasons why “moral animus” should play no part in the mens rea for 
murder. N om e’s suggestion would appear to excuse those such as terrorists and contract 
killers who had no particular feelings for their victims. By contrast, it also appears to 
condemn as murderers those who, for example, are in abusive relationships and hate their 
tormentors, and try only to frighten them off. Furthermore, o f the cases Norrie 
considered, it is unclear that differences of “moral animus” do in fact determine our 
moral reactions. It is a fair inference that if  Mr Moloney believed that it was virtually 
certain that the result o f pulling the trigger o f the gun he was holding would be the death 
o f his stepfather, few people would have any difficulty in finding that, whatever the prior 
history o f the relationship between them (and unless, for example, Mr Moloney was 
suffering from a serious psychological disability or had some other excuse), he 
committed murder. Cases such as that o f Mrs Hyam fall into the difficult category of
152 See Helen Beynon, “Doctors as Murderers”, [1982] Crim.L.R. 17 on this principle and the conditions in 
which such duties may exist.
153 In “After Woollin” [1999] Crim.L.R. 532.
154 [1985] 2 W.L.R. 648.
155 [1998] 3 W.L.R. 382.
156 [1974] 2 W.L.R. 607.
'” [1986] W.L.R. 1025.
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probable harms: as was submitted in Chapter 5, there are strong arguments why such 
offences may be considered as murder; but there are also good arguments, and perhaps 
more persuasive ones, to the contrary (and a new offence, o f callous indifference to death, 
may be appropriate in such scenarios). But we still tend to draw moral distinctions of the 
basis o f the beliefs of such people. We would find Mrs Hyam more culpable if she 
considered there to have been a likelihood of people dying rather than a slight risk of 
people being injured, and more culpable still if  she had been sure that the woman or the 
children would die. Considering the case of Mr Moloney again, we would find him less 
culpable if he had not been sure whether pulling the trigger of the gun would kill his 
stepfather than if he had been sure. Such distinctions are objective, and are based on the 
widely accepted principle o f moral choice. Distinctions on the basis o f factors such as 
“moral animus” seem more subjective and difficult to justify morally, and if and when 
they can be agreed on and justified, they would seem to depend very much on the facts of 
particular cases, and are therefore perhaps better addressed at the sentencing stage.
What has been said o f murder can also be applied to other assault offences for the 
same reasons, albeit that the types of harm envisaged and/or resulting are less serious.
Theft (and other property offences). The mens rea of theft is “the intention of 
permanently depriving” another o f her property, and doing so dishonestly. Rarely will 
the desire involved in theft be itself immoral: the most likely desire involved in theft is 
material gain. For that desire (or any other) to result in a theft crime, it needs to be joined 
with a belief that the property belongs to someone else and with dishonesty in 
appropriating it. There will always be a desire associated with theft, as with any action, 
but desire is not a requirement. Desires and other factors may provide the motive and 
may aggravate or mitigate the offence, but it is the belief component that establishes the 
intention, and intention plus dishonesty that establishes the mental element o f the 158
158 The dishonesty element makes the relevant harm in theft harder to identify than in murder or other 
assault crimes. The belief aspect of intention is as to the owner of the property. However, that would not 
be sufficient to establish that the agent believed that harm would result from her actions in appropriating 
the property. She also has to appropriate the property dishonestly. But that is also partly dependent on her 
belief about the property -  she has to believe that what she is doing is regarded as dishonest, and as a result, 
understands that society considers that her actions cause harm (R v Ghosh (1982) 75 Cr.App.R. 154).
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Cases of oblique intention cannot be envisaged for theft crimes. However, scenarios 
can be envisaged in which possessions will drop into people’s hands without any desire 
to obtain such property. For example, suppose armed robbers plan to take control o f a 
security van by force in order to steal its contents. They have no desire to possess the van 
-  in fact they would much rather be rid of it -  but they come to realise after the robbery 
that unless they take permanent possession of it, it may provide evidence linking them to 
the crime, so afterwards they take it to pieces, reconstitute it and hold on to it. It is not 
any desire that establishes culpability of theft, but rather the belief that it belonged to 
others and the dishonesty in appropriating it.
It should also be noted that there are a number of theft offences apart from simple 
theft, which similarly do not require a desire component. Furthermore, there are a range 
o f property crimes, such as drug trafficking and money laundering offences, that do not 
have the traditional mens rea of negligence, recklessness and intention, but instead have 
similar mental elements based solely on the level of belief, whether, for example, “having 
reasonable grounds to suspect”, “suspecting”, or “knowing” facts about the property that 
make the relevant conduct criminal. This provides further indication that the mens rea 
for all property crimes is based on relevant levels o f belief, and is not dependent on 
particular desires.
Rape (and other sex offences!. Rape is something of a composite of intention, 
recklessness and negligence: the intention is to have sex, not reasonably believing that the 
other person consents (Sexual Offences Act 2003, section 1). Desire is not what makes 
it a crime -  there is nothing wrong with desiring sex. A crime is only committed when 
the deliberateness to have sex is coupled with the lack o f reasonable belief. The person 
who rapes sadistically may be deserving of a worse sentence, but the non-sadistic rapist is 
still a rapist. He has used his victim to the same extent.
Thus the sadistic rapist does not become a rapist only because of a desire to have sex 
with someone who does not consent. That desire may provide his motive for committing 
rape, but he only commits rape if he has sex and does not reasonably believe that the 
other person consents. If he has sex with someone who he reasonably believes is 
consenting (even if  he wishes that the person was not consenting) he does not commit
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rape. It is submitted that this is for good reasons: if  the law was otherwise, the male 
partner in a consenting couple indulging in rape fantasies would be guilty of rape.
Desire and other factors may provide the motive, and may aggravate or mitigate the 
offence, but do not establish its mental element. As with theft, it is belief, not desire, that 
is the relevant component of intention for rape. For the same reasons, the same is true of 
other sex offences requiring intention.
2) Appropriate punishment. Once it has been established that an intention crime has 
been committed, a variety of moral factors may be relevant in assessing the type and level 
of punishment, depending on the facts of the particular case. These can include the desire 
of the agent, and (as Chapter 6 identified) any number o f a wide range o f other factors.
The fact that the belief component existed should not feature at all at the sentencing 
stage. It is a yes-or-no question, and once it has been established at the conviction stage 
that the agent believed that the harm would result if  her action was successful, that is the 
end o f that inquiry.
However, it will be usual for the particular harm to vary within categories of crime, 
and so type of belief about the harm will vary, and may be o f relevance to sentence. In 
respect of murder, for example, a belief that serious harm would result may give good 
grounds for a lower tariff than a belief that death would result.
The strength of the belief -  the belief as to the virtual certainty or otherwise o f the 
harm’s occurring, which establishes whether the crime has been committed -  should not 
have any impact on the sentencing, since it is an all-or-nothing state o f mind. However, 
if  the “virtual certainty” test was to be replaced with a lower threshold of foresight, which 
thus established a range of beliefs as to probability sufficient for conviction, there would 
be scope for grading punishments according to the strength o f belief.
Beliefs other than the belief component may be relevant at the sentencing stage; but, 
as mentioned in Chapter 5, such beliefs are not the concern o f this thesis.
Moral justification of the categorisation of intention crimes by the belief component
The account above accords roughly -  and, it is submitted, ought to accord more 
accurately -  with the way in which charges of intention crimes are currently tried, and in
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which those convicted of intention crimes are sentenced. In other words, this thesis is 
arguing that once it has been established that the relevant causative action is voluntary, 
belief ought to be the only moral factor in determining whether an intention crime has 
prima facie been committed (other factors being relevant in ascertaining whether there is 
a defence). But can that categorisation by the belief component be morally justified? A 
number o f reasons are offered below in an attempt to offer such a justification.
1) Justifications of punishment and the purpose of criminal law. Many attempts 
have been made to justify punishment. The traditional distinction is between utilitarian 
and retributive theories, but many variants exist, which can be categorised in various 
ways. According to J.R. Lucas, for example, there are the following groups o f theories: 
“Preventive” (to prevent the criminal from re-offending); “Deterrent” (to deter both the 
criminal from re-offending and others from offending at all); “Reformative” (to reform 
the criminal so that she is no longer minded to be antisocial); “Vindictive” (to pay people 
back for having done wrong); and “Vindicative” (to vindicate the law and the victim by 
making the wrongdoer visibly not get away with it).159
Whichever theory or combination of theories is considered to provide the best 
justification of punishment, it is submitted that common to all is a requirement that there ' 
is some conformity to socially accepted moral standards. With retributive theories this is 
more or less self-evident. The extent to which the moral retribution is or should be 
socially accepted may be open to question, but since morality -  or at least, the 
interpretation of morality by the legislature and the courts -  is a social concept, 
punishment on a retributive model is likely to conform at least roughly to a socially 
accepted moral standard. With utilitarian theories the link is less obvious; but if  such 
theories are to work in practice, it is likely that punishments need to take account o f 
social reactions to different types of crime. It has been noted earlier in this thesis that it is 
widely accepted that people react differently to harms committed deliberately as opposed 
to those committed otherwise. A clumsy blow is distinguished from a deliberate one; the 
person who absent-mindedly picks up someone else’s property is distinguished from the 
thief. If the overall sum of harm is to be minimised, those who cause harm in a socially 
blameless way should not (as far as possible) be punished at all, and severer deterrents
159 Responsibility, Oxford, 1993, Appendix 2, page 280 onwards.
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should generally be provided against intention crimes than against recklessness and 
negligence crimes: to do otherwise would substantially weaken people’s respect for laws 
in general, cause more laws to be broken, and result in more harm. It may also be the 
case that there is a greater need to deter deliberate harm, since such harm may tend to 
result in greater suffering.160
Since the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate harm is often o f great 
importance socially, it is unsurprising that the distinction tends to be decided at the 
conviction stage.161 To abolish the distinction may cause a great deal of social damage 
for no good reason. There is also the risk that the law would be seriously out o f kilter 
with social norms: decisions by the courts could be made without people understanding 
the reasons behind them, and the power o f the state could grow unchecked, with the 
attendant dangers that can be recognised in authoritarian states.162
If morality’s ultimate end (or at least a significant one of those ends) is the maximising 
of good and the minimising of harm163, rules governing a society should as far as possible 
be followed by members of that society, and those rules should promote that end as far as 
possible. If the law does not reflect morality as commonly understood -  or as is 
commonly capable o f being understood -  there is the risk that the rules will be broken 
more frequently, and greater harm will result. Conversely, if  the law makes sense to 
people, then they are more likely to avoid flaunting it if  it is, as far as practicable, 
consistent with morality as commonly understood or understandable. If, for example, the 
same punishment results for death caused through blameless, negligent or reckless 
driving as for death resulting from a contract killing, some people may take the view that 
punishment is a lottery, and they may as well do as they like.
160 See, for example, Mirko Bagaric, Punishment and Sentencing: A Rational Approach, London, 2001, at 
page 104. However, see also Barbara Wootton, Crime and the Criminal Law, 2nd edition, London, 1981, at 
page 27 and elsewhere, who argued that many non-intentional offences (such as death caused by driving) 
create more harm cumulatively, and thus may merit equally severe punishment.
161 Not everyone considers that it should be decided at this stage: see for example Barbara Wootton, ibid. 
Wootton’s proposals were considered in Chapter 3.
165 This has been noted by, for example, William Kneale in “The Responsibility of Criminals” at pages
194-195 in H.B. Acton ed., The Philosophy o f  Punishment, London, 1969.16̂ John Kekes, for example, considered it to be “common ground among those who are committed to 
morality and who think about its nature that its ultimate purpose and justification is to prevent evil and 
promote good”: “The Reflexivity of Evil”, in E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller, J. Paul eds, Virtue and Vice, 
Cambridge, 1998, page 225.
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2) Justification of moral responsibility: choice and constitutive luck.
Distinguishing deliberate harms from others may accord with our instinctive notions of 
morality, but there remains the problem of whether it can be justified. It has been argued 
in previous chapters (especially Chapters 5 and 6) that the reason deliberate harm is 
considered more culpable than other types of harm is that the former is more o f the 
agent’s choice: a deliberate harm can be accurately described as a fully chosen harm, but 
a reckless or negligent harm cannot be. As has been noted in Chapter 3, will and choice 
have traditionally been understood as the touchstones of morality, and so (absent other 
considerations) we hold people most morally responsible for harms they have fully 
chosen to cause.
But given the problems of hard determinism and other objections to the concept of 
moral responsibility, and the fact that moral reactions are influenced by factors other than 
the extent of a person’s responsibility for her actions, is there anything to be said for 
placing greater significance on those other factors? The criminal law punishes people 
more for their actions than for their characters, and on the basis of their cognitive more 
than their affective states. It may be considered unfair and unwise to load severe 
punishments on what may be momentary lapses by some, while others, whose antisocial 
tendencies are far more pronounced, may be treated much more leniently.164
This brings the discussion back to the moral relevance o f desire. Regardless of 
people’s actions -  their moral choices -  if  some have more immoral desires than others, 
should they not be treated more harshly? One answer to this is that people cannot choose 
their desires, and it may be unfair to blame them for something that is beyond their 
control.165 * People do judge others for their desires in certain circumstances -  the 
paedophile may be judged simply for the sort of person she is, whatever her actions. But 
usually it is recognised that it is not the desire that is wrong but the acting on it -  such as 
wanting sex with someone and not resisting when the realisation dawns that the other 
party is underage. The stigma attaching to paedophiles is a rare case o f people being 
blamed simply because o f their desires (and that stigma may be the result o f ignorance
164 In recent years there have been a number of proponents o f “virtue theory”, who seek to identify ethics 
b^character rather than actions. See for example Michael Slote, From Morality to Virtue, Oxford, 1992.
This point has been made by, for example, Galen Strawson in his Freedom and Belief, Oxford, 1986, at 
page 49.
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and fear rather than actual moral outrage). Normally we do not blame people on the basis 
of their desires alone, but because of the way in which, or the extent to which, they act on 
them. It is submitted that very few if any desires can be justifiably considered themselves 
immoral (sadistic desires may be an exception, although again it is arguable that merely 
having such desires is not itself immoral).166 We do consider, however, that in some way 
people have the choice whether to act on their desires.167
It is not possible to decide whether this is justifiable without again considering the 
question of moral responsibility. As noted in Chapter 3, there is the further question of 
whether people should be blamed for their lack o f self-control, since it seems as much a 
matter of “constitutive luck”168 whether we are bom with good or bad self-control as 
whether we are bom with tendencies to have good and bad desires. But instinctively we 
continue to feel that people have more o f an internal say in their moral choices than in 
their desires -  that the former are more in their control -  and that it is appropriate to judge 
people accordingly.
Morality is not a science, and it cannot be proved that a person bom with bad desires is 
less immoral than someone who makes bad moral choices or vice versa. We perhaps 
know too little about matters such as the true extent o f moral responsibility to base 
criminal law on one theory or another. It does seem, however, that even if  it cannot be 
fully justified, there are some grounds for concluding that it is more justifiable to judge 
people morally on the basis o f their actions rather than their desires, if  only because our 
experience suggests that there is little that we can do about our desires, but we can, in 
some way, have some control over whether and how we act on them.
Criminal law is not a science either, and has to deal with society as it is. Accepted 
morality remains a social reality, and that morality agrees that it is more appropriate to 
judge choices than desires. And what does seem unequivocal is that the existence o f
6 Greg Taylor in “Concepts of Intention in German Criminal Law”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 
24, No.l (2004) 99 noted (at page 106) that “an actor’s final goal (getting rich, enjoying life more) is, 
generally speaking, unlikely to be punishable in itself.”
67 It has been argued that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility: see, for example, J.M. 
Fischer an M. Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, Cambridge, 1998, page 25.
168 The effect of constitutive luck and other types of moral luck is discussed by Andrew Ashworth in 
“Taking the Consequences” in Action and Value in the Criminal Law, edited by Stephen Shute, John 
Gardner and Jeremy Horder, Oxford, 1993.
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punishment may have an impact on whether we “choose” to act on immoral desires.169 
At a practical level, given that debates about moral responsibility do not appear capable 
o f being settled, that may be more important. Although it may be the case that the 
individual who is heavily punished for making a bad “choice” is not in fact truly 
culpable, or as culpable, as society holds her to be, nevertheless if  the punishment she 
receives reduces the amount of harm she is likely to commit in the future, and deters 
others from doing so, then there is at least an argument that it may serve some good 
social purpose overall, even taking into account some possible injustice to her.170 There 
is no sufficiently strong competing argument to justify punishing those on the basis of 
their desires. Furthermore, if  people were to be punished for having desires regardless of 
choices they made, that would logically include punishing them for desires that had no 
harmful results or no likelihood o f harmful results, which seems to serve no useful 
purpose, and seems hard to justify.171 If we cannot answer the question whether choices 
or desires should be culpable, and since criminal law exists to limit harmful actions, there 
are thus good reasons why it should concentrate on actions rather than characters. The 
law has limited expertise and limited resources: it cannot and should not be the final 
arbiter of all moral judgements.
So punishment primarily based on choice, action, and cognitive states appears better 
suited in performing the social function o f preventing harm. It may be morally 
appropriate, and indeed socially beneficial, to take account o f desires, characters and 
affective states in determining the level o f punishment. But to decide whether people 
should be punished for offences at all on the basis o f such characteristics would be 
socially harmful, and contrary to the main purposes for which the criminal law exists. 
The main moral justification for belief-based categorisation is thus perhaps the broader 
social justification o f reducing harm.
3) Particular practical problems of an alternative. As well as the broad social 
justification identified in section 2) above, there are a number o f specific practical
169 This has been noted by, for example, D.J. O’Connor in his Free Will, London, 1971, at pages 32-33.
170 For public policy arguments in favour of punishing those who may not be truly autonomous for the 
harms they cause, see John Kekes, ibid. For public policy arguments in favour of punishing those who 
have complete subjective defences, see Jeremy Horder, “Cognition, Emotion, and Criminal Culpability”, 
Law Quarterly Review 1990,469.
171 On this see C.L. Ten, Crime, Guilt and Punishment, Oxford, 1987.
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reasons why distinguishing intention offences on the basis of desires and other 
characteristics rather than on belief may be socially harmful, and thus morally 
disadvantageous.
Firstly, there are good moral reasons for avoiding unnecessary complications: the 
more chaotic the system, the less harm is likely to be averted, and the more injustice is 
likely to occur. Simplicity in a system of law should not trump other moral concerns; but 
compelling moral reasons should be required in order that a more complicated system 
(with the greater potential for harm that would be involved) is preferred.172
Whereas desires and other factors vary enormously, the belief component is of 
universal application. In establishing that the mens rea o f an intention offence has taken 
place, a court can be told to consider a simple question in every case: did the defendant 
cause the harm deliberately? Or, if  more explanation is required in particular 
circumstances, did the defendant believe that her action if successful would (virtually 
certainly) result in the relevant harm?
It would be much more difficult to devise a common test on the basis of desire. It 
would be insufficient to ask the question whether the defendant desired the relevant harm, 
because except in very rare cases the harm itself is not desired.173 Even if such a test was 
expanded to include causing the relevant harm as a means to a desired end this would not 
solve the problem. There would be evidential difficulties in establishing whether the 
relevant harm was a means rather than a side-effect. There may be a mixture o f desires, 
some good and some bad. A full assessment of the morality o f desires involved in an 
action would require a much more complicated, and practically unworkable, series of 
tests -  in fact the only workable system that could be envisaged is one in which the court
Nigel Walker made a similar point in a different context {Why Punish?, Oxford, 1991, page 137), when 
he stated: “If an objective is obviously or probably unattainable, and attempts to obtain it involve the 
imposition of suffering, hardship, or inconvenience, this in itself amounts to a conclusive moral objection to
those attempts.”
173 Sadistic crimes, though rare, do of course occur. However, some philosophers have even doubted that 
there can be such thing as pleasure in causing harm. Augustine, for example, did not consider that anyone 
could murder purely for pleasure (Confessions, II v 11: Oxford World’s Classics, 1998, page 30). G.E.M. 
Anscombe noted that “Hobbes believed, perhaps wrongly, that there could be no such thing as pleasure in 
mere cruelty, simply in another’s suffering; but he was not so wrong as we are likely to think.” {Intention, 
Oxford, 1957, page 73.) As Anscombe noted, what precisely is desired is perhaps not the harm itself but, 
for example, the pleasure derived from power over the victim. However, two such consequences are 
clearly very closely linked, and for the purposes of this thesis it is assumed that people sometimes do desire 
the harms they cause.
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simply decides whether the relevant action resulted from, on balance, good or bad 
desires, which appears too loose a test in deciding such important matters.
Deciding whether offences had been caused on the basis of other factors could not 
involve any standard at all and would, if  anything, be even more impractical.
Even if  a test could be established, there may be considerable difficulty in establishing 
motives and other factors evidentially. An advantage o f the constant belief standard is 
that it is relatively easy to establish. Although, as with any assessment of mental states, 
courts can never prove the existence of the belief component, in law as in life it is usually 
relatively easy to infer whether harm has been inflicted deliberately or not. Desires and 
motives tend to be much harder to establish to the same degree o f satisfaction.174 We 
often do not even understand our own desires, which may be a mixture o f various 
emotional and instinctive urges and considered reasons.175 As has been stated, “The 
Devil himself knows not the heart o f man”.176 What would happen if  a defendant might 
have acted out o f one or both of two desires, one good and one bad? Similarly, the 
plethora o f other factors that may impact on a moral assessment of a particular action 
may be difficult to establish, especially to the criminal standard o f proof. Would further 
evidence need to be admitted in respect of, for example, a defendant’s background, a 
victim’s background, and the history of the relationship between them? It is not difficult 
to imagine severe practical difficulties of mounting fair trials on this basis. The resulting 
lack of certainty may cause considerable confusion among adjudicators, who have a 
difficult enough job as it is.
Secondly, basing liability for offences on the findings of others as to what motives or 
other desires or characteristics the defendants had, and whether such findings met with 
approval or disapproval with courts, is not only arguably unfair in itself, but is also likely 
to diminish the chances o f the criminal law being socially accepted as objective and fair. 
Minorities and the materially disadvantaged may well feel more vulnerable if such a 
system was implemented. For example, an unemployed black man from a broken family
174
See, for example, William Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory, Oxford, 2002, pages 154-155, 
and Thomas Morawetz, The Philosophy o f  Law, New York, 1980, page 226 onwards.
175 Greg Taylor in “Concepts of Intention in German Criminal Law”, (2004) Oxford Journal o f Legal 
Studies, 99, stated (at page 122) that “Disposition is a complex psychological phenomenon, sometimes 
involving contradictory states of mind, not a simple matter of yes or no, on or off.”
176 Quoted in Nigel Walker, Why Punish?, Oxford, 1991, page 98.
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with a juvenile criminal record may already feel, facing judgment on a criminal charge by 
lay magistrates who are white and comfortably-off, that he has little chance o f justice; but 
how much more apprehensive might he feel realising that his guilt is to be assessed, not 
for what he had done, but for the sort o f character he was? Furthermore, if  the criminal 
law is to have any restorative function, it requires the possibility -  indeed the promise -  
o f recognition of moral improvement. To condemn people for having bad characters 
reduces the prospect of rehabilitation. That seems not only unfair to the defendant, but 
also not in the interests of society at large, to do so.177
Thirdly, punishing people for the way they are and what thoughts they have -  rather 
than what they do -  would mean greater state interference in people’s lives. It would be 
difficult to construct definitions o f offences without providing the conditions for what (at 
least) the liberal-minded would regard as unwarranted state intrusion. An example given 
earlier in the chapter of the possible criminalising o f the male partner in a consenting 
couple indulging in rape fantasies indicates these dangers. Not only would there be 
greater state interference, but that interference would also be more uncertain: it would be 
much more difficult for me to predict when the state may punish me on the basis of its 
assessment o f my desires, and to avoid situations in which I am punished on that basis, 
than it is when punishment is based on cognitive failings, which are easier for society to 
assess and easier for individuals to avoid. It is relatively easy to identify when we may 
consider committing deliberate harm. It is more difficult to identify when we may have 
desires that may be disapproved of in a particular context, or whether we are acting in or 
out o f character, or whether we are displaying socially inappropriate “moral animus” 
towards someone else. The rule of law functions properly only when people have a good 
idea where they stand in relation to the law. Not only would an alternative system be 
offensive to liberal values, it is also less likely to encourage people to conform to the law.
177 One of the reasons Hyman Gross, in A Theory o f  Criminal Justice, Oxford, 1979, considered that the 
law ought to concentrate on acts not persons was that people change over time — it may be unfair, as well as 
unwise, to blame someone for the person she is at a particular time (page 29).
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Summary; why belief tends to be of more moral significance than other factors
There are differences in our moral reactions to who people are and what they do -  
even if the two are often linked -  and we feel that punishment is more appropriately 
geared towards actions than personalities. In George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda we may 
feel revulsion, or we may feel sympathy, or we may feel both, towards Gwendolen 
Harleth, when she fails to rescue her abusive husband from drowning. It is plain that she 
desired his death. But we feel that the question whether she should be punished depends 
on her action at the crucial time: did she choose to kill him? If she did, her desires, her 
background, and a number of her other characteristics may determine the appropriate 
level o f punishment. But we need to settle that central issue first. We recognise that the 
criminal law exists to prevent and condemn harms, not to judge moral character.
It is submitted that it follows from consideration of the points raised in this chapter 
that there are good moral reasons why the belief component of intention should be used, 
rather than the desire component or some other factor, to determine whether an agent has 
criminal intention. In fact, it may be that supporters of the doctrine of double effect, and 
any others who consider desire to be o f particular importance, would agree with this to 
some extent.178 It has been submitted that there may be good enough moral reasons in 
themselves for focusing on choice as the main determinant o f intention, but the 
difficulties o f establishing a justification for this have been acknowledged. But in any 
event there are plenty o f good practical, social reasons why this basis o f categorisation is 
to be preferred to an alternative based on desire or character. Given the absence of any 
compelling moral reasons favouring the alternative, it is submitted that these reasons 
provide sufficient moral justification in themselves.
178 •For example, Michael Moore, in his Placing Blame, Oxford, 1997, at page 411, has stated: “The 
differences in culpability between belief states undoubtedly exceeds the difference in culpability between 
the most culpable belief (of certain wrongdoing) and the yet more culpable states of intention or desire.”
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CONCLUSION
Summary of the preceding chapters
The introduction identified that the debates about the meaning of intention in the 
criminal law have not been settled. It also identified that there had not been a full 
analysis o f the moral role that belief plays as a part of the concept of intention in this 
context.
C hapter 1 concluded that belief is a necessary component of intention -  that no 
serious argument can be maintained against the contention that intention crime actions 
will always involve relevant beliefs. It used this conclusion to assist in identifying an 
accurate description o f all intention crime actions. While acknowledging that absolute 
precision may be impossible, it was submitted that the word “intention” itself causes 
more problems than it solves. For the rest o f the thesis the words “deliberate” and 
“deliberately” were used to describe all situations in which the agent chooses to inflict 
consequences, whether as means, ends, or side-effects.
C hapter 2 concluded that, in the absence o f any persuasive arguments to depart from 
convention, “belief’ would be the word used in this thesis to describe the relevant mental 
state for intention. It identified the following characteristics o f belief as being of 
particular importance: 1) beliefs are subjective and internal; 2) beliefs are that their 
contents are true; 3) beliefs can be unconsciously held; 4) beliefs are generally 
involuntary; 5) a belief that p , without more, is simply that p , not that possibly p, or that 
probably p , or that certainly p.
C hapter 3 concluded that the concept o f intention in the criminal law is grounded in 
morality, and that the concept brings the question of moral responsibility into the 
conviction stage o f the criminal justice process for those offences for which it is a 
requirement. Despite a number o f objections to the assumptions that moral responsibility 
exists, or can meaningfully be assessed, it was argued that the existence o f the concept of 
intention in the criminal law is clearly based on such assumptions. It was further argued
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that while the arguments about those objections are unlikely ever to be resolved, morality 
based on such assumptions is a social reality. While acknowledging that the moral 
assumptions behind this reality may be hard to justify, it was argued that it remains 
worthwhile analysing it on its own terms. And since belief is a necessary component o f 
intention crimes, and intention in this context is a moral concept, it remains worthwhile 
considering the moral significance of belief.
C hapter 4 concluded that as far as the belief component of intention is concerned, it is 
not the belief itself that attracts moral censure. The relevant belief is that harm will or 
may occur as a result o f the agent’s action. The moral significance derives from the 
choice to act despite such a belief. The following properties of such a belief were 
identified: 1) the belief concerns the successful outcome of actions; 2) the belief is o f 
virtually certainty of harm; 3) the belief is not unconscious; 4) the belief must be that held 
by the agent; 5) the belief cannot be falsely held; and 6) the belief need not match the 
harm, but must be proportionate to it.
C hapter 5 concluded that belief always has a central moral role to play in defining 
intention crimes. It was submitted that it is not the moral quality o f the belief itself that is 
important, but rather the fact that an agent chooses to act in a particular way despite the 
belief that harm will occur if  the action is successful. Without that belief, a crime cannot 
properly be distinguished from one committed recklessly or negligently. All such harms 
caused, whether by direct or oblique intention, should be distinguished from those 
committed recklessly or negligently. That distinction is important, because we react 
differently to harms caused deliberately rather than otherwise, and ascribe different levels 
o f responsibility accordingly. It is for that reason that the distinction is properly reflected 
in the categorisation o f mens rea concepts in the criminal law.
C hapter 6 considered other factors o f moral significance in establishing intention 
crimes, and identified desire as the other relevant component apart from belief. The 
following points were drawn from the analysis o f the importance of desire:
• There will always be a desire prompting the action that results in the harm. However, 
the closeness o f the connection between that desire and the harm can vary 
significantly. • .
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• The doctrine o f double effect may be o f relevance in determining the degree o f 
censure in certain circumstances. However, it is not always relevant, and even when 
it may be, its importance can be slight.
• Nevertheless desire is often a relevant factor in determining how we react to 
deliberate harm. It may play a part in determining whether we consider particular 
deliberate harms intention crimes at all -  albeit only a part. Desire can also be 
relevant in determining what level o f censure we consider appropriate -  albeit that 
there are often other relevant factors involved.
• The closeness o f the desire to the harm caused, the nature o f  the desire, and the other 
circumstances in which that desire arose, can be more important than the question o f 
whether the harm was directly or obliquely intended.
C hapter 7 compared the moral significance o f belief with other factors, including 
desire and character. It concluded that there are differences in our moral reactions to who 
people are and what they do -  even if  the two are often linked -  and we feel that 
punishment is more appropriately geared towards actions than personalities.
It was submitted that it followed from consideration o f the points raised in this chapter 
that there are good moral reasons why the belief component o f intention should be used, 
rather than the desire component or some other factor, to determine whether an agent has 
criminal intention. It was submitted that there may be good enough moral reasons in 
themselves for focusing on choice as the main determinant o f intention, but the 
difficulties o f establishing a justification for this were acknowledged. But, it was further 
argued, in any event there are plenty o f good practical, social reasons why this basis o f 
categorisation is to be preferred to an alternative based on desire or character. It was 
submitted that, given the absence of any compelling moral reasons favouring the 
alternative, these practical reasons provide sufficient moral justification in themselves. 
The following moral and practical reasons were identified in particular:
• Many intention crimes can only be established on the basis o f the belief 
component.
• In respect o f those intention crimes that may arguably be established on a 
different basis, such as murder, people still tend to draw important moral 
distinctions on the basis o f  whether the harm is committed deliberately or not.
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• Because the making o f moral distinctions between deliberate and non- 
deliberate harm is a social fact, there is the risk o f  erosion o f the rule o f law if 
that fact is not sufficiently recognised.
• Basing crimes on the belief component is to base them on the question o f the 
agent’s choice. Choice has long been considered the touchstone o f morality. 
There is more reason to suppose that we have some control over our moral 
choices than over our desires and other characteristics.
• Even if distinguishing intention crimes on the basis of choice cannot be 
justified morally, there is good reason to believe that punishment based on 
choice is more likely to deter criminal activity than punishment based on desire 
or character. Limiting such activity is the primary aim of the criminal law.
• Whereas the belief component test is o f universal application, it would be hard 
to establish a universal test based on desire or other factors. In addition, 
whereas the belief component is relatively easy to establish, it would often be 
difficult to establish motives and relevant characteristics to the appropriate 
standard o f proof. Any unnecessary complication brought about by such 
changes would allow greater harm and more injustice to occur.
• Basing convictions on the subjectivity o f character assessments may weaken 
the impartiality o f  the law, or at least its perceived impartiality. In particular, 
that could leave many o f the oppressed in society feeling more at risk o f 
prejudice. Furthermore, it could reduce the effectiveness o f the law’s 
restorative function.
• Basing convictions on such criteria may allow unwarranted state intrusion into 
people’s lives, and, by causing uncertainty as to what amounted to intention 
offences, may undermine the rule o f law.
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Final comments
Iris Murdoch stated that, in respect of moral issues, “The concept o f intentionality is ... 
likely to cause confusion; I think we are better without it.”179 Intention certainly has 
caused confusion in the criminal law, and that confusion has not been cleared up. It is a 
moral issue, but one bound up with terminology. If the terminology can be clarified, the 
moral issue may become clearer.
It has been submitted that the criminal law has correctly recognised, albeit only 
implicitly and in an unsatisfactory manner, that belief is the key moral component o f 
intention crimes. To base it on desire or any other factor would be socially damaging. It 
ought to be more clearly recognised that it is the belief component that should determine 
whether someone has criminal intention, and it ought to be more clearly expressed in the 
law. In order to clarify this in law, it is the final submission o f this thesis that the concept 
o f intentional harms ought to be replaced with the concept o f  deliberate harms. A full 
definition o f deliberate harm would be as follows: a harm is committed deliberately when 
a defendant believes that it will (virtually certainly) occur i f  her action is successful. 
Defences could cover all situations in which deliberate harm is caused with lawful 
excuse. Sentences could address aggravating or mitigating factors associated with 
socially unacceptable desires and other factors.
Redefining these crimes as deliberate harms -  focussing on belief and thereby on 
moral choice -  would leave the difficulties and debates over the meaning o f intention in 
the past. The most serious o f offences -  those in which harms were fully chosen -  would 
then be more clearly categorised on the basis o f accepted moral principles, more clearly 
focussed on the key purpose o f the criminal law o f minimising harms in a way that is fair 
and socially legitimate, and more clearly defined for adjudicators to understand.
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